

## EU Neighbourhood Europeanization and European Identities of Elites in Ukraine

Paper presented for the Workshop on  
*Elites and the Formation of Identity in Post Soviet Space*  
(Cambridge University, 11 June 2010)

### **Preliminary, not for citation**

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Classically, national identity is defined through stressing the similarities of the in-group (the 'Self') and its differences with those outside the political community ('the Others') (Armstrong 1982, Duara 1996, Kuzio 2001, Neumann and Welsh 1991). Accordingly, demarcation of boundaries are seen as main prerequisites that make contrasting in-groups in relation to 'the Others' possible and in such a way help to build a particular national identity. However, the key role of boundaries is increasingly challenged by globalisation (Segbers 2001). Global forces, trends and flows have weakened the restrictive nature and impact of boundaries and influenced identity building on their own. Furthermore, the number and deepness of regional integration increased. As the result, national identities have become accompanied with the supra-national identities built through regional integration. The nexus between national and supra-national identities becomes especially visible in the post-communist countries, which in addition to building civic and/or ethnic components of their national identities in a top-down and/or bottom-up way constructed their supra-national – European, Slavic or Eurasian – identities.

The case of Ukraine is telling in this respect. Since country's independence in 1991, the process of changing and evolving national identity in Ukraine has been under influence of global forces and in the constant flux of integration in Slavic (pro-Russian) or/and European communities. Before the Orange Revolution of 2004, national identity building vacillated back and forth between self-sufficiency and 'inferiority complex' (Motyl 1993). Thereby, building of national identity was accompanied with building of supra-national ones. While 'inferiority complex' took the form of 'little russianism' and willingness to 'attach' to Russia, self-sufficiency was not regarded as a process of isolation, but was often seen to be reinforced by willingness to 'attach' to the Western European integration processes, such as the EU and NATO (Kuzio 2001).<sup>1</sup> The Orange Revolution ended the Kuchma's foreign policy of

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<sup>1</sup> Similar to the willingness to 'attach' to Russia, the willingness to 'attach' to the EU and NATO could be interpreted as 'inferiority complex'. However, most observers consider integration to the West as the way to strengthen Ukraine's independence, while cooperation with Russia is seen as unequal and as such threatening Ukraine's independence.

‘multivectoralism’<sup>2</sup> and marked the decisive turn in building Ukraine’s national identity as a European nation through closer cooperation and integration with the EU.<sup>3</sup> This ‘European turn’ became visible in the positions of political elite and in the attitudes of the population. However, the recent decline of the Orange coalition and the comeback of pro-Russian positions in the leadership of Viktor Yanukovich and Mykola Azarov in 2010 as well as the decrease in popular support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU put this turn in question.<sup>4</sup>

In this paper, we map building of national and supra-national (collective) identity in Ukraine. Referring to the previous research on identity building in Ukraine as an elite-driven process (Grossman 2007, Kuzio 2001, Melnykovska and Schweickert 2008), we primarily focus on identities of political parties as the main domestic forces in identity building during the Orange times (2005-2010). In particular, we show which elite groups represented European identity and promoted its building in the population. Furthermore, we consider external forces that enhance or hinder building European identity in the elite groups. Thereby, we analyse the tools of the EU’s Neighbourhood Europeanization through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern Partnership (EaP) that are targeted at the political elite and might influence their identities directly. According to our hypotheses elite identities are determined by the responsiveness of elite groups to either cost-benefit related ENP tools like demands and rewards or, alternatively, to socialization tools like linkages applied in the ENP. We also take into account the EU’s tools that are targeted at the population thereby influencing the identities of the political elite indirectly.

Our analysis of an EU influence on identity building in the neighbouring country enriches EU studies which by now were limited to the analyses of the EU’s identity building role among its members and Eastern European accession candidates in the frameworks of Membership and Accession Europeanisation (Harmsen and Wilson 2000, Risse 2001, Schild 2003, Seidendorf 2003). Our paper also adds to area studies on building Ukraine’s national identity, which by now were limited to the analyses of legacies and domestic factors and to a large extent overlooked the impact of global forces.

The paper consists of six sections. In the second section, we outline the main features of post-communist identity building, which we present in the form of dichotomies, and draw our conceptual framework to be apply for analysis of identity building in Ukraine. In the third section, we map the national and European identities in Ukraine. In the following sections, we analyse the identities of the Ukrainian political parties as they are articulated in the parties’ programmed and official speeches of parties’ leaders (the fourth section) and the EU tools in the framework of Neighbourhood Europeanisation as one of the main external forces (the fifth section) in Ukraine’s identity building. Finally, we summarise.

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<sup>2</sup> The foreign policy of the president Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) enhanced international cooperation and Ukraine’s integration along multiple and often contradicting ‘vectors’ and was regarded as ‘multi-vectoralism’.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, the results of opinion polls of Eurasian Monitor (<http://www.eurasiamonitor.org/eng/>) and Razumkov Center (<http://uceps.org/ukr/socpolls.php>).

<sup>4</sup> Yanukovich has begun back-tracking on the history politics of the Yushchenko era. Answering questions at the Council of Europe on 27 April he declared that the Holodomor (the Stalinist Famine of the early 1930s) was not genocide, as *Yushchenko* has sought to argue, and in any case starvation was widespread ‘in Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan’. This removes a key irritant in relations with Russia. Furthermore, Yanukovich-Azarov appointed Dmytro Tabachnyk is a notorious Ukrainophobe to be a new Minister of Education. However, in fact the new political leadership cares little about cultural politics. They still want to protect their own pragmatic cost-benefit-driven interests.

## *Post-Communist Identity Building – Conceptual Considerations*

Identity building is a complex and fluid process, those multilayered and dynamic nature has been facilitated in post-communist societies (Bhabha 1990, Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Judy and Wolczuk 2002). Indeed, identity building in these countries was complicated by their multi-ethnic composition, legacies of Soviet federalism, nationalisation and Russification policies and simultaneous political, economic and societal transformations from communist dictatorship and plan economy towards democracy and market taking place (Coppieters 1998). Accordingly, identity building in the post-communist countries has proceeded along several dichotomies.

### *Ethnic or Civic Identity – What is first?*

The demise of the Warsaw Bloc and the Soviet Union enhanced academic debates about the trade-off between building ethnic and civic components of national identities (Table 1).<sup>5</sup> Thereby, the main challenge of post-communist identity building was to define what features did or would unite most of the members of a particular post-communist nation and what components of national identity – ethnic or civic – had to be given the priority (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000, Knack and Keefer 1997, Shulman 2002a).<sup>6</sup>

Table 1 – Components of national identity

<b>National identity</b>	
Ethnic components	Civic components
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- a common culture, customs and traditions</li> <li>- a common language</li> <li>- common ancestry</li> <li>- a common history and a common destiny</li> <li>- Common race</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- national independence and sovereignty</li> <li>- a common political and legal system</li> <li>- common rights and duties</li> <li>- a common system of social security/welfare</li> <li>- a national economy</li> <li>- a national army</li> <li>- common borders</li> <li>- a feeling of national pride</li> <li>- national character</li> <li>- national symbols (the flag, the national anthem, etc.)</li> </ul>

*Source: own illustration based on (Shulman 2004, Smith 1991).*

Some scholars prioritized ethnic components, as for them the new states in Eastern Europe were ‘nationalising states’ or ‘nationalising regimes’ that dwelled on particularism. They believed that civic identity had little chance of prevailing in the new states, given the “pervasively institutionalized understandings of nationality as fundamentally ethnocultural

<sup>5</sup> Ethnic components are based on the vision of national identity as a historical phenomenon, in the course of which the population of a particular territory accumulate historical experiences, share common memories, traditions and language. The civic components are derived from the vision of national identity that concentrates on the structure and contents of opinions, attitudes and beliefs of citizens in common political principles, possession of state citizenship, representation by a common set of political institutions and desire or consent to be part of the nation.

<sup>6</sup> Currently, it is recognised that the dichotomy between civic and ethnic components is a simplified vision of identity. Instead, the researcher further differentiate between pure ethnic and cultural components, distinguish hybrid identities, including both civil and ethnic components, and stress the importance of other identity dimensions, e.g., tolerance of out-groups and the degree of ethnic attachment (Hansen and Hesli 2009).

rather than political, as sharply distinct from citizenship, and as grounding claims to ownership of polities” (Brubaker 1996), p. 105. Thus, according to these scholars post-communist state authorities would have to promote the local mores, traditions, culture, national character or even race of the titular ethnic group (Brubaker 1996, Schopflin 1996, Smith 1998). Moreover, building of identity based on ethnic components had to dominate because new states were built in opposition to communist rule as a kind of “‘national project’, where it was difficult for any civic dimension of nationhood to emerge” (Schopflin 1996), p. 153. In addition, under circumstances of post-communist institution building from scratch, economic recession, widespread corruption and weak rule of law, ethnic identity was regarded most likely to fill institutional vacuum (Snyder 1993)

An opposing school of thought highlighted the importance of civic components. The representatives of this school warned against building ethnic identity in the multi-ethnic post-communist states with competing traditions and historical experiences (Geertz 1993), because ethnic nationalism is based on exclusiveness of the titular ethnic group and would potentially lead to violence and state disintegration (Ignatieff 1993). On the contrary, civic identity is based on inclusiveness and corresponds to values and behaviours supportive of democratic society. Thus, it would promote democratization of post-communist countries (Shulman 2002a).

There was also the middle position those representatives largely agreed that the projects of identity building in post-communist countries would need to encompass both ethnic and civic components of identity to be successful, but the exact composition of ethnic and civic components depends on specific features of a particular country and should be defined in an individual way (Wolczuk 2000).

### *The Nexus between the National and the Supra-National*

Identity building in the post-communist states has proceeded at the time of increased globalisation and regional integration. These states have been suppressed with the Soviet collective identity for many decades and their national identities at the time of independence were far from being well-established and especially open to global influences. Therefore, post-communist identity building is a ‘dual-track’ process, as building national identity there has been accompanied with building supra-national (collective) identities. Furthermore, these two processes were not going separately, but in the nexus and with overlaps, as the building of supra-national identities was expected to promote the building of national ones. Hence, the population majority in the post-communist countries, especially of Central and Eastern Europe, have two identities, national and European (Pollack 2004). The supra-national identity was nested in national identities and the components of supra-national identity were used as yardsticks for self-definition. Thus, we argue that the analysis of identity building in the post-communist countries should apply the approach of ‘integration’ (instead of ‘boundaries’) and extend the vision of identity building as the process of integration with ‘the Similar’.

The post-communist countries have had thereby a choice between several groups of ‘the similar’ and supra-national identities accordingly. In particular, Central and Eastern European countries built their national identities in the course of their ‘return to Europe’ through integration in the European Union (EU). Their national identities were accompanied with

European supra-national identity. The EU gives a broad and revisable definition of the term 'European' as one that 'combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute to European identity. The shared experience of ideas, values, and historical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple timeless formula and is subject to review by each succeeding generation' (EU 2006). According to Habermas (Habermas 1992), European identity is based on the values of peace, democracy, respect for human and minority rights, social justice and welfare.<sup>7</sup> In the same vein, the Treaty of Lisbon (Art. 49) lists freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law as EU principals. Hence, European identity is rather civic than ethnic identity (Baycroft 2004, Herrmann et al. 2004, Neumann 2001).

At the other corner of the post-communist empire, Eurasianism proposes a geopolitical solution for the countries between East and West, in the zone called "Eurasia," and supports the idea of an organic unity of cultures born in this zone of symbiosis between Russian, Turkic, Muslim and even Chinese worlds (Laruelle 2004). For those countries that did not feel to be a part of Asia (e.g., Ukraine, Belarus and situation dependent even Russia), the Eastern Slavic identity was another option (Wilson 2004).

### *Building Identity – Bottom-Up or Top-Down?*

Post-communist identity building is driven by elite,<sup>8</sup> predominantly political elite, which is defined as consisting of the highest state officials in the executive branch of the government (the president and his apparatus), the members of the Cabinet of Ministers and the members of the parliament. Apart from ethnic and cultural demography as well as age and effectiveness of the state and its institutions, discourse within political elite and state policies have been recognized to shape mass attitudes towards national identity and to be the main sources of ethnic and civic nationalism (Shulman 2002b). In addition to national identities, elite strengthen supra-national form of identification (Wolczuk 2000). For political elite, identity building was a 'practical issue, vexed, and contentious, which spells life or death for the nationalist project of creating a nation' (Smith 1986), p.148. By increasing the 'we-feeling' among its citizens and their desire for common statehood, national and supra-national identities legitimize government, increases political stability and assists policy makers in the formation and implementation of coherent and effective policies (D'Anieri 2002). E.g., to legitimise the regime's rule through identity, the authoritarian rulers in Central Asia created symbols of national heroes and traditions for their titular nations and forced ideological conformity concerning interpretations of history (Laruelle 2007). Furthermore, attachment to a particular integration process in the terms of belonging to its supra-national identity was seen as a means to integrate to that integration process in political and economic terms. In this vein, the political leadership in Central and Eastern European countries stressed European identity of their nations and justified the 'right' to be included in the process of EU integration (Jerez-Mir et al. 2009, Pridham 2007).

The political elite have a plenty of means at their disposal for identity building. Ruling elite precariously juxtaposed and articulated historizing and memorizing themes, also called

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<sup>7</sup> So far, there is no consensus on what European identity is and what it involves, because European identity means different things to people in different countries (Fligstein 2008).

<sup>8</sup> In addition to political elite, the influences of cultural elite and business elite might be considered, but their influences in identity building is either weak or indirect.

‘official narrative’, in their political programs, public speeches, interviews (Wolczuk 2000). For this, it relied on their access to state-controlled media and institutional resources of the state. Furthermore, political elite formulated and implemented state policies, responsible for identity building, e. g., citizenship, language, education, cultural and immigration policies. Thereby, political elite made a choice between four models: 1) ‘nationalising’, which involves political activity to promote a ‘core’ nation; 2) ‘civic’, meaning that the state is ‘owned’ by all citizens, regardless of ethnicity; 3) ‘bi- or multi-national’, in which state ownership is shared by two or more dominant ethnic groups; and 4) ‘hybrid’, where the state is defined as belonging to a core nation, yet minority rights are guaranteed and nationalising policies that seek to assimilate non-core ethnic groups are limited (Brubaker 1996).

The role of the population and civil society in the post-communist identity building has been recognised only recently. The decades of communism and Soviet rule destroyed civil society, turning population into “civic deserts” characterized by mistrust and atomization (Brubaker 1996). Indeed, population and civil society was neither a driving nor constraining force of institution building during the early transition years (Melnykovska and Schweickert 2008). Especially, post-Soviet countries had the least participatory civil societies in the world (Howard 2002). Their civil societies were regarded as weak and ‘rootless’ and their population as passive. However, in the course of the parliamentarisation and colour revolutions the meaning of population and civil society has been steadily increasing (Kailitz 2007, Stykow 2010). Due to subsequent political instabilities, election has been more often and more fair across the post-communist countries. In their turn, political elite whose power increasingly depends on popular vote has become more driven by popular attitudes and the civil society organizations gained on ‘roots’.

### *Identity Building – Domestic or International Deal?*

Post-communist identity building has been open to external forces, which influence building national and supra-national identities in a direct and indirect ways. Directly, external forces construct the population identities; indirectly, they aim to shape the identities of the elite, which consequently spread their identities among population. Thereby, external forces rely on cost-benefit related tools like demands, rewards and financial support, alternatively, to socialization tools like linkages. In the same vein, they might play role not only in building of national identities, but also disseminate and promote supra-national identities. The main external forces that play a pivotal role in post-communist identity building are the EU and Russia.

The EU is the key force in external identity building, as its normative and transformative powers are widely recognised (Duncan 2000, Laffan and Monnet 2004, Manners 2006, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, Sjursen 2006). While the process of EU integration has deepened and the number of ‘Europeanised’ policy areas has expanded, European identity was reinforced among EU members in the course of so called Membership Europeanisation (Fligstein 2008). The ideas of European identity were also present in the EU Eastern enlargement, where common and shared values were the key criteria (Bos 2009). Post-communist states aspired to shed their ‘Eastern’ image by integrating into the EU, stress their historical belonging to Europe and were ready to overtake civic components of European identity demanded by the EU in Accession Europeanisation (Herrmann and Brewer 2004).

Furthermore, the borders of European identity have not ended with the EU's institutional borders, as the EU's cultural borders are inclusive (Eigmüller 2010). The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) aim in line with the concept of Wider Europe to promote 'the rings of friends with shared values' in the EU's neighbourhood. Hence, the EU also forges European identity through Neighbourhood Europeanisation.

The EU applies both rationalist cost-benefit tools and constructivist tools of socialisation to forge identity building. It put demands on fair and free elections, observation of human and minority rights. The EU also offers rewards and incentives for these demands, with EU membership as the largest reward. As a 'soft' power, the EU uses the power of 'attraction' with regards to political values and social welfare (Nye 2004). Socialisation effects are expected from people-to-people and elite contacts. As the result, many researchers confirm the positive effects of EU conditionality and socialization in the areas of free election, minority rights and the rule of law (Gawrich et al. 2009, Schimmelfennig 2005, Vachudova 2005).<sup>9</sup>

As a most influential kin state, Russia is another key factor in post-communist, in particular post-Soviet, identity building. Furthermore, since the last decade, Russia has been trying to regain its influence, especially in the former republics of the Soviet Union, so called 'Near Abroad' (Aksenyonok 2008, Aslund and Kuchins 2009, Bugajski 2008, Kagan 2008). According to President Dmitri Medvedev Russia pays special attention to regions of Russian privileged interests.<sup>10</sup> As for ethnic identity, it is doubtful whether Russia exports Eurasian or Eastern Slavic identities, rather compatriots' issue in the near abroad has become part of the Russian state's new strategy to recover its power (Laruelle 2008). Although there is no scientific consensus whether Russia exports the civic identity of authoritarianism, Russia's foreign policy consistently strengthens autocrats' coercive state capacity and destabilizes democratizing states in the region (Ambrosio 2009, Bader et al. 2009, Tolstrup 2009). At least, Russia's goals seem to be incompatible with those of the EU (Duncan 2000, Kramer 2008).

Similarly to the EU, Russia applies a plenty of tools. The most effective rationalist tool is cheap energy prices. The Russian government has been attempting to generate international opposition to what it calls human rights abuses conducted by some governments of post-communist countries (Fawn 2009). Contrary to the EU's strategy, Russia's policy works against minority integration by reinforcing pre-existing domestic norms that are not compatible with European minority rights standards. Moreover, with the proclaimed aim to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they may be, it aggravated tensions over history and language in the areas of post-Soviet 'frozen' conflicts (Schulze 2010).

Taking into account the above mentioned dichotomies, we elaborate the conceptual framework to analyse post-communist identity building (Figure 1). We distinguish between ethnic and civic components within both national and supranational identities. We put the focus on the political elite, which to our mind are the main domestic forces in the post-


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<sup>9</sup> However, some researchers doubt EU transformative power and explain the compliance with EU values and standards of the Central and Eastern European countries with other factors, e.g. domestic context (Exadaktylos and Radaell 2009). The other researchers demonstrate the short-term sustainability of that compliance with the EU values (Sasse 2004).

<sup>10</sup> Dmitri Medvedev, interview on Euronews television channel, Moscow, September 2, 2008; [www.kremlin.ru](http://www.kremlin.ru)

communist identity building. Thereby, we analyse the means of political elite through which elite representatives articulate their identity, i.e., party programs, official discourse and state policies. We also regard the external forces that influence identity building in a particular post-communist country. However, we concentrate on the EU and its tools directed to the elite and population, because Russia seems rather to instrumentalise existing post-Soviet national identities, than promote particular national and supra-national identities. Furthermore, observers argue that Russian direct activities on identity building – promotion of ‘a simple Russian human’ on the basis of *Homo sovieticus* – concentrated only on some regions, e.g., the Crimean population (Polischuk 2010).<sup>11</sup>

Figure 1 – Our conceptual framework



We apply our analytical concept for the case of Ukraine, which is a post-communist country with multiple ethnic cleavages and developing civic identity (D'Anieri 2002). In addition, building national identity is linked in Ukraine to supra-national identities, European and Eastern Slavic. Both national and supranational identities are largely constructed by the elite, in particular by the political parties, which gain power and meaning after constitutional reforms in the course of the Orange Revolution and transformation of Ukraine from semi-presidential to parliamentary-presidential republic (Rodgers 2006). In addition, the support for the Ukrainian parliament *Verkhovna Rada* in the population has increased from 43% in 2000 to 55% in April 2009; while 76% population did not support activities of the president in April 2009 (in comparison to app. 40% on April 2000).<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, Ukraine is the most

<sup>11</sup> Indeed, the actions of Russian government seems to successful as the number of Crimean respondents who concern themselves as patriots has been rapidly decreasing: 37% in 2007; 9,2% in 2008.

<sup>12</sup> These are results of the surveys conducted by Razumkov Centre, available at: [http://uceps.org/eng/poll.php?poll\\_id=67](http://uceps.org/eng/poll.php?poll_id=67); and [http://uceps.org/eng/poll.php?poll\\_id=68](http://uceps.org/eng/poll.php?poll_id=68)

likely case of the EU's Neighbourhood Europeanisation. In other words, if the EU influenced identity building in its neighbourhood, then it would do it in Ukraine. Ukraine shows strong willingness of cooperation and it is highly interested in becoming an EU member. Furthermore, Ukraine is a consolidating democracy and should have low adaptation costs while overtaking EU values. Its dependence on the EU – e.g., in economic- and in security-related terms also promotes the success of EU tools.

### *Mapping Identity and Identity Building in Ukraine*

#### *From Weak to Strong, from Many to One – Is there any Consolidation of Popular National Identities in Post-Orange Ukraine?*

The collapse of the Soviet Union gave the impulse to Ukraine's independence and the recovery of Ukrainian national identity, which had been for years suppressed by the Soviet rule. At the first glance the perspectives for identity building were promising. About 91% of the citizens supported in 1991 the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. Thereby, according to the Soviet census conducted in 1989 73% of Ukraine's citizens considered themselves Ukrainian and 22% Russian (Zastavnyi 1994). In the national survey of 1997, these were 69% und 20% respectively. When the possibility of dual or situational identity was given in the 1997 survey, 56% respondents saw themselves as only Ukrainian, while 11% regarded themselves as only Russians; 27% were both Ukrainians and Russians (Wilson 2002). According to the first post-Soviet national census of 2001, 77,8% of population regarded themselves as Ukrainians and 17,3% as Russians, which revealed a substantial exodus of ethnic Russians from Ukraine and in some cases their ethnic re-identification as Ukrainians (Rowland 2004).

However, for those who regarded themselves as Ukrainians, belonging to Ukrainian ethnical group did not mean having sense of the Ukrainian national identity. Along the Soviet traditions, people defined themselves as Ukrainians due to the place of residence and/or due to paternal inheritance (Simonsen 1999, Wolczuk 2000). Thus, it was not a real national (ethnic or civic) identity, but a 'passport' one (Wilson 2002). The mismatch between ethnicity and national identity became visible at the first presidential election in Ukraine of 1991. Viacheslav Chornovil, who was one of the most important members of the People's Movement of Ukraine (RUKH) and whose presidential candidate program was built on the values of Ukrainian national identity, received only around 23% of votes. Apparently, the core Ukrainian tradition, involving concentric overlap between Ukrainian ethnicity, language, culture and religion, and adherence to the mythology of the historical independence movements was a minority faith (Wilson 1997). Hence, despite a substantial number of citizens who regarded themselves as Ukrainians, Ukrainian national identity was weak (Riabchuk 2000, Wilson 1997, Wilson 2000). In particular, the civic national identity had to be built 'from scratch', as it could not rest on any stable historical and cultural core to develop powerful transcendent ideas of liberty, prosperity and welfare, a common social contract of reciprocal rights and obligations, or constitutional patriotism (Wilson 2002).

In addition to the weakness of Ukrainian identity, the heterogeneity of views what made up Ukrainian identity in ethnic terms posed another challenge to identity building in independent

Ukraine (Barrington and Herron 2004). Apart from the ethnic identities of minority groups,<sup>13</sup> there are three Ukrainian ethnic identities that competed for the status of being Ukrainian national identity. Each of these ethnic identities was embedded in a broader set of beliefs, historical memories, as well as religious, linguistic and policy preferences, forming what were labelled ‘national identity complexes’ in particular regions of Ukraine (Shulman 2004).<sup>14</sup>

- *Ethnic Ukrainian* identity prevailed in the western regions and stressed the values of individualism, freedom, democracy and tolerance. The dominance of these values was devoted to the historic heritage of more liberal Austro-Hungarian empire and to the later (in comparison with other Ukrainian regions) incorporation in the Soviet Union. Most representatives of this identity felt more convenient to speak Ukrainian language and articulated a strong sense of national pride (Nikolayenko 2008). They were also interested in day-to-day political affairs, were continuously active, both during and between elections. Ethnic Ukrainians were also strongly supportive of democratic and market reforms (Shulman 2005a).
- *Eastern Slavic* identity was common in the south eastern regions and highlighted the values of collectivism and patrimonialism. Russian language prevailed there. *Eastern Slavic* Ukrainians are largely inactive between elections, less supportive to democratic and market reforms and were the main base of support for oligarchs and centrist parties (Kuzio 2005). The civil society is also weakest in these regions.
- *Soviet Ukrainian* identity was the mix-identity of the central regions. Through the 1990s this identity was regarded as amorphous in the terms of civic components, because this part of the population was ‘conserved in a feudal, premodern and prenatal stage of development’ (Riabchuk 1994), p.132. In terms of ethnic components, *Soviet Ukrainian* identity was hybrid (Pirie 1996) and also demonstrated less clear ethnic components due to the melting of the multiple ethnicities settled in these regions (Rjabtschuk 2009) and due to erosion of linguistic and ethnic boundaries between Russophones and Ukrainophones (Wolczuk 2000). *Soviet Ukrainian* identity rooted from *Homo sovieticus* with low values of culture and religion and with a specific mix of Ukrainian and Russian language – *surzhyk*. *Soviet Ukrainians* often regretted at the passing of the Soviet Union, but also support Ukraine’s independence (Wilson 2002). Their historical memories were limited to the Soviet times, but their historical consciousness represented the overlap of the mythology of the Soviet propaganda about the Ukrainian Soviet nation and of the ethno-ethnic legends about Ukraine’s attempts to achieve independence in the previous centuries (Hrytsenko 1998). This group of mix-identity was regarded as the key to any potential majority in Ukrainian society.

Despite the multiple projects to forge a single all-national identity, up to day Ukraine is very far from being an ethnic homogenous entity and these three ethnic identities persist (Barrington and Faranda 2009, Kulyk 2009, Lane 2008). However, over the years of

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<sup>13</sup> The most influential thereby is the identity of the Russian minority group, which is concentrated in five south eastern regions – Donetsk Oblast, Luhansk Oblast, Kharkiv Oblast, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Zaporizhzhya Oblast – and in Crimea.

<sup>14</sup> Despite certain overlaps, the borders between these identities did not match with the religious, linguistic and regional borders.

independence these identities have overlapped and fused, leaving the vast areas between them often holding characteristics of both of them, to varying degrees. Thus, these identities have interacted, leaving many citizens of Ukraine holding double, very fluid and ambivalent identities.

The Orange Revolution of 2004 marked a new stage of Ukrainian society development and ended of the previous political epoch on the hybrid Soviet-type system (Stepanenko 2005, 614). However, whether the Orange Revolution brought any change with regard to Ukrainian identity is a highly disputable issue. Some observers believe Yushchenko's active mass support was drawn from the 'ethnic Ukrainian' rather than the 'eastern Slavic' identity (Lane 2008). These scholars are skeptical, because for them the events of the Orange Revolution did not initiate, and the consequences did not effect, integrating mechanisms creating solidarity – the formation of a 'civic Ukraine' – but led to greater division between East and West Ukraine (Lane 2008). Furthermore, they argue that the Orange Revolution rather intensified than decrease divisions and Ukraine has become even more polarized (Rodgers 2006). On the contrary, the other group of scholars argue that the Orange Revolution gave the birth to a political nation in Ukraine (Rjabtschuk 2009).<sup>15</sup> Andrew Wilson (2005, p. 210), for example, refers to 'Viktor Yushchenko's value-based campaign, which helped consolidate a new version of the "national idea"'.

Besides the disputable effects concerning national identity at the country's level, the Orange Revolution has brought its results at the regional level. During the presidential elections of 2004 16 regions of Western and Central Ukraine voted for nationalistic and pro-democratic candidate Viktor Yushchenko. Hence, the mix-identity of *Soviet Ukrainians* appeared to incorporate civic components of *Ethnic Ukrainians* such as democracy, liberty, prosperity and welfare. Perhaps, the projects of civic identity building, conducted during the presidency of Kuchma might have their fruits in the central regions (Arel 2005).

In the course of the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian national identity has become rather civic than cultural and it is civic nationalism that prevails in Ukraine. Thereby, being Ukrainian means to have positive attitude to democracy and market reforms (Shulman 2005b) and builds the ground for civil society. However, this positive development has been threatened by the Ukrainian political elite who spur on ethnic differences among the regions for gaining votes in the enduring political crisis. This leads to the trend of rejection by some part of the population of everything that is connected with definition 'Ukrainian' and 'national', which someone calls the crisis of national identity.

#### *Any Chance for Unification through Building European Identity?*

Building the Ukrainian national identity is a dual-track process. Besides its national identity, Ukraine builds its supra-national identity.<sup>16</sup> From the one hand this dual nature of identity building is caused by Soviet experiences and due to increasing influences of globalisation. Centuries during which Ukraine was a part of the Moscovia state, the Russian empire, and then the USSR helped to form the Ukrainians' willingness to be attached to its

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<sup>15</sup> According to surveys of public opinion, the number of the Ukrainian patriot has increased from 60% in 2003 to 75% in 2006; around 60% of citizens were ready to fight for their country in the armed conflicts (Yakymenko and Lytvynenko 2006).

<sup>16</sup> In addition to national and supra-national identities, regional and local identities are present in Ukraine, but they are not the subject of this paper.

strong ‘neighbour’/‘elder brother’ Russia. This willingness still persists despite Ukraine’s fifteen years of independence. From the other hand, identity building in Ukraine proceeds at the time of globalisation and is influenced by integration processes in the neighbourhood.

Thus, not only ‘Others’ is necessary to be defined, but also groups of the similar ‘Our’. In the Ukrainian case, the main candidates for the ‘Other’ and ‘Our’ are Europe (primarily the EU) and Russia. However, there is a great disagreement in the elite and in the population on how to culturally compare Ukraine with other nations. They disagree about who is the primary ‘Other’ against which Ukrainian national identity is defined and who is the primary ‘Our’-the people or peoples that are portrayed as culturally similar to the people of Ukraine and who thus also shape Ukrainian identity (Shulman 2004).

*Ethnic Ukrainians* stress large cultural differences between Ukrainians and Russians, and thus Russia serves for them as the primary ‘Other’. They argue that Ukrainian culture is part and parcel of European culture-the Ukrainian ‘Our’. For them, the linear progression of the primordial community into a nation state was frustrated by Russia’s imperial aspirations, as the later separated Ukraine from its European roots (Wolczuk 2000). Similarly, modern Ukrainian nationalism stresses the close relationships between Ukraine and Europe, which are regarded as even more central than the relationships with Russia (Rjabtschuk 2009). Furthermore, modern Ukrainian nationalism rarely proclaim self-sufficiency, but regards being attached to Europe and building European identity as a way to strength the Ukrainian national identity (Table 2). Being Ukrainian and being European are set equal to each other.

On the contrary, the proponents of *Eastern Slavic* identity stress the very similar historical and cultural development of the three Eastern Slavic peoples Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian. They see Ukraine as a part of the Eurasian economic and cultural space. They believe Ukraine’s future lays in closer cooperation with Russia and are proponents of the supra-national identity of ‘little russianism’, also called ‘Eurasianism’.

Table 2 – The nexus between national and supra-national identities in Ukraine

National identity	Ethnic Ukrainians	Soviet Ukrainians	Eastern Slavic
Principle of identity building	Self-sufficiency	Willingness to attach	
Foreign policy orientation	Neutrality	Integration in the EU	Close cooperation with Russia
Supra-national (collective) identity	-	European Identity	Little-russianism (Eurasianism)

Source: own illustration.

Therefore, in the western regions of Ukraine, where the Ukrainian ethnic identity and Ukrainian civic nationalism are stronger, the support for integration with the EU is higher.<sup>17</sup> Thus, Ukrainian civic nationalism is an important driver of imaginary and real Europeanisation (Rjabtschuk 2009). On the contrary, in the eastern and southern regions, where Soviet nostalgia prevails and the Ukrainian identity is weaker, the support for

<sup>17</sup> Although Ukraine has had a clear majority in favour of European integration, other directions of external orientation are also supported in public opinion. Furthermore, the population maintains different orientations at the same time without seeing them as conflicting each other.

democracy is lower and aspirations for close relationships with Russia prevail (Reznik 2001). As for the central regions of mix-ethnic Soviet Ukrainian identity, in line with strengthening of civic identity, these regions add on positive attitude to Ukraine's integration in the EU after the Orange Revolution. According to the surveys conducted by the Razumkov Centre through 2005-2008 about 40% respondents in the central regions see the EU as the main foreign policy priority.<sup>18</sup> According to the survey of the GFK Group in April 2010, 60% respondents in central regions (69% in western regions) support Ukraine's accession to the EU,<sup>19</sup> while 31-35% respondents in the eastern and south regions are against.<sup>20</sup> Thereby, the slow pace of economic reforms, corruption and democratic deficits are defined to be the main barriers on the way of Ukraine's accession to the EU (Razumkov-Centre 2010).

However, the population is currently losing its initially positive attitude. According to Razumkov Centre (Razumkov-Centre 2010), the number of supporters for Ukraine's accession to the EU has scaled back to 44,4% in November 2009 (in comparison to over 50% in the immediate aftermath of the Orange Revolution in December 2004 – February 2005). Respectively, the percentage of those who are against EU integration increased from 28% in December 2004 – February 2005 to about 40 % in November 2009, from Western to Eastern Ukraine, EU rejection is increasing (Razumkov-Centre 2010). This negative trend is the result of domestic political struggles and the missing EU membership perspective. The population interprets ENP and its Action Plan as a 'temporary mechanism' for Ukraine on the road to EU membership (White et al. 2008). Thus, it is disappointed that there is no EU membership perspective in the new Association Agreement announced during EU-Ukraine summit in September 2008. The EaP offers partnership, which is better than neighbourhood, but has so far changed little on public attitudes. In its turn, this negative trend put democratic and market reforms driven by Neighbourhood Europeanisation under threat, as pro-EU political forces in Ukraine are losing their popular support.

Against this background, the promotion of the European identity in Ukraine becomes essential to support Europeanisation reforms even without EU's membership perspective. Furthermore, European identity is the identity that can unite all Ukrainian citizens, regardless of their ethnic identity. By embracing 'Europe', Ukraine has a chance to both submerge the internal divisions and replace the previous supra-national community, the 'Soviet people'. (Wolczuk 2000). Besides, the EU itself, Ukrainian political elite are the main force to enhance European civic values among Ukraine's population.

#### *Identity Building after the Orange Revolution – Catalytic Role for Political Parties?*

Throughout the years of independence, the political elite in Ukraine has committed to maintaining an independent state. Building national identity within the boundaries of the new state promised to promote a reconfiguration of the political space and belonged therefore to the main tasks of the political elite since Ukraine's independence. The observers agree that even under the more Russophile Kuchma, the Ukrainian leadership still continued the main tenets of the nation-building project, because they believed that if Ukraine wished to maintain

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<sup>18</sup> [http://uceps.org/ukr/poll.php?poll\\_id=119](http://uceps.org/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=119)

<sup>19</sup> Thereby only 11% respondents from the central regions in the survey of Razumkov Centre see themselves as belonging to the European history and culture (Razumkov-Centre 2010).

<sup>20</sup> [http://www.gfk.ua/public\\_relations/press/press\\_articles/005859/index.ua.html](http://www.gfk.ua/public_relations/press/press_articles/005859/index.ua.html)

itself as an independent state it had no choice but to continue nation-building policies that seek to mould a national identity different to its neighbours (principally Russia), with its own 'unique' history that helps to create a sense of difference (Janmaat 2000, Kolsto 2000). Thereby, the political elite constructed national identity of the population by articulating foreign policy orientations and defining a 'Self' different to 'Others' and in integration with 'the Similar'.

Against the background of debates on the components of a national identity, it is not surprising that there were official discourses on giving priority to the building of an inclusive, civic or ethnic nation within both regimes of Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) and Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004).<sup>21</sup> Although much of the controversy dealt with two variants of ethnic national identity (*Ethnic Ukrainian* and *Eastern Slavic*) and this controversy was further instrumentalised in the election campaigns, the priority in state policies was given to building civic components (Szporluk 2000). E.g., Kuchma, who won the presidency with the slogans contrasting to the values of Ukrainian ethnic identity and promised to promote Eastern Slavic identity, enacted state policies different to his election program. His policies gave citizens of all ethnic backgrounds equal political and economic rights (Shulman 2005c).<sup>22</sup> The same civic priorities seem to be articulated by the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich.<sup>23</sup>

Although the presidents remains to play an important role in identity building after the Orange Revolution, in this paper we concentrate on the role of political parties that gain on influence in parliamentary-presidential Ukraine.<sup>24</sup> Political parties have the ability to form a single Ukrainian national identity and to promote European choice, but they can also exploit ethnic cleavages for electoral purposes and further polarize voters (Dafflon 2008).

#### *Party Programms: From little russianism to European choice?*

Obviously, sentiments against a European identity are increasing in Ukraine. This raises the question about the catalytic function of parties and elites who participate as candidates in the elections and thus supposedly represent the people's interests in the parliament as the state's highest legislative body. Members of the political elite were also treated as those who

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<sup>21</sup> In the case of Ukraine, there were arguments in favor and against both types of components (Shulman 2002b). The civic components could be promoted by the existence of a quasi-state the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and develop around its territorial and political heritage. However, the previous civic identity of Homo sovieticus could be hardly taken as a basis for national identity of a new democratic state. In addition, the civic components had to be impeded by the young age of the Ukrainian state and by the economic crisis, which in combination with rampant corruption and crime should weaken civic notions of the nation and by the low trust in the political system, inherited from the Soviet Union. Building of ethnic components seemed to be easier to implement, but was troubled by the lack of ethnic, religious, cultural and historical commons in the Ukrainian regions that had experienced quite different historical paths and generally low importance of language and ethnicity due to Soviet legacies (Arel and Ruble 2006, Rjabtschuk 2009).

<sup>22</sup> E.g., Ukraine's constitution of 1996 defines 'Ukrainian nation as citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities'.

<sup>23</sup> In his inauguration speech, he described Ukraine as 'a bridge between East and West, simultaneously an integral part of Europe and the former Soviet Union', that will now seek to 'get maximum results from the development of equal and mutually beneficial relations with Russia, the European Union and the United States'. Yanukovich also reiterated a long-term desire for EU membership and claims to be 'committed to the integration of European values in Ukraine'.

<sup>24</sup> As part of the compromise to rerun the controversial second round of the 2004 presidential election, some of the anti-Kuchma coalition joined with the 'party of power' to pass a constitutional reform that substantially reduced the powers of the president, and correspondingly augmented the powers of the prime minister and parliament (D'Anieri 2005).

spread national ideas among the masses (electorate). Perhaps not surprisingly, the political elites voice their opinions on how Ukraine should be developed. In so doing, politicians might transmit different variants of identities while defending the particular orientation – ‘vector’ – of state development that they consider to be the most ‘appropriate’ and advantageous. By examining the election programme documents, we want to explore which identities were forged by the parties that participated in the parliamentary elections in 2006 and re-elections in 2007. Thereby, the method of discourse/content analysis was used.

The 2006 sample consisted of the eleven programmes of the election campaign participants: the Party of Regions (PR), the Ukrainian Communist Party (KPU), the ‘Our Ukraine’ (NU), Yulia Tymoshenko’s Block (BYT), the Socialist Party (SPU), Vitrenko’s Block (NO-Vitrenko), the People’s Block of Lytvyn (PBL), the NDP Block (NDP), the Kostenko-Plyuschch Block (NBKP), Viche (Viche), and the PORA-PRP Block (Pora-PRP). Regarding the re-elections in 2007, the programme documents of eight parties and blocks were examined: the Party of Regions, Yulia Tymoshenko’s Block (KPU), the ‘Our Ukraine – National Self-Defence’ Block (NU-NS), the Ukrainian Communist Party, the Lytvyn Block (PBL), Vitrenko’s Block, the Suprun Block (Block L. Suprun, including the NDP), and the Ukrainian Socialist Party.

We construct two indicators to measure the vectors of identity building. The first indicator measures the link between Ukrainian national and a particular supra-national identity that was articulated through the external orientation of Ukraine proclaimed in the programmes. We give this indicator the label ‘Willingness of Attachment’. This reflects the observation that certain political parties or blocks want Ukraine to be politically and economically aligned with an orientation-vector (either pro-Russian or pro-Western), and feel that it is necessary for Ukraine to join particular organizations or unions (of states). As there are two main external orientations for Ukraine, we also disaggregate the indicator ‘Willingness of Attachment’ into two sub-indicators: ‘Russian Orientation’ and ‘Western Orientation’. ‘Russian Orientation’, as outlined in the parties’ programmes and presented during the public speeches of their leaders, was also determined as a proof of building ‘little russianism’-identity. ‘Western Orientation’ was considered to be the counterpart to the pro-Russian discourse. For example, the pro-Russian vector was evident in the case of the programme that advocated entering the Single Economic Space (SES), joining Russia and forming a new Union of Independent States (consisting of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as well as other post-Soviet states); the pro-Western vector was found to exist in the documents of the parties or blocks declaring their desire to have Ukraine join the EU, NATO or the WTO.

We take the uncertainty about self-sufficiency of one’s own national identity as the second indicator to identify the values of identity building promoted by the elites. Grounded theory methodology was used to define this feature. Therefore, the analysis categories were formed after the research had been conducted. Several groups of the characteristics were defined and their presence was used to prove the lack of a sense of self-sufficiency in Ukraine’s national identity. The documents were checked for the following tactics/rhetorical devices:

- using ‘European’ as a Ukrainian quality, describing Ukraine as a ‘European’ state;
- looking to ‘European’ and world standards as a blueprint for achieving a civilized society;
- separating Ukraine into regions and emphasizing the difference between them;

- expressing the intention to develop Ukraine with external help;
- offering to give Ukrainians legal opportunities to work abroad;
- calling attention to the defence of national interests, including intentions to join the collective security formation of other states;
- ignoring or addressing the language question.

The first indicator was measured by the number of instances of ‘willingness to be attached’ and therefore demonstration of the particular vector of ‘attaching’ (to either pro-Russian or pro-Western entities). A particular party or block got one point for each expression of willingness to attach to an external formation. This indicator scale had two vectors (sub-indicators), directed oppositely. The index of the ‘willingness to be attached’ vector displayed the discovered orientations, either pro-Russian or pro-Western, to determine the directions; in the event that both directions were present, the difference between the two vector scores was calculated.

The procedure of quantification enabled us to compare how strongly ‘little russianism’ was expressed by the different political forces according to two dimensions: the lack of a sense of self-sufficiency and the quality of ‘willingness to be attached’ (regarding Russia or other countries). For this reason, each feature present was assigned a value of 1, with 0 denoting the absence of the inferiority complex. Other factors also affirmed a particular degree of ‘little russianism’. Given below, Figure 2 (Figure 3) visualizes the position of the political parties and blocks prior to the 2006 (2007) parliamentary elections with respect to the degree of the ‘little russianism’ inferiority complex exhibited by the Ukrainian political elite.

Figure 2 – Ukrainian parties and blocks during the 2006 parliamentary election campaign





Figure 3 – Ukrainian parties and blocks during the 2007 parliamentary re-election



Comparing the results presented in the two figures reveals some confirmation for the theoretical concept of ‘little russianism’ as outlined above:

- In 2006 we observe that most of the countries are clustered around a rather neutral position with respect to their orientation, i.e. their willingness to be attached. Few outliers are to be observed which allowed for a higher degree of uncertainty or extreme positions with respect to either Western or Russian orientation shown in the party’s programme. None of the outliers, except for NU to some extent, played an important in the new parliament.
- In a way, most parties reacted within one year to the outcome of the 2006 elections and alternative trajectories became clearer. If we draw a line between SPU and PSPU in Figure 3, this could represent a trajectory which implies that higher levels of uncertainty go together with an increasing orientation towards Russia. Different to that, drawing a line from SPU to NU-NS, reveals a pro-Western trajectory which implies a willingness to be attached to the West determined by a higher level of uncertainty. Obviously, however, higher uncertainty leads to a higher degree of Russian orientation than Western orientation. In addition, one outlier is BYT which allows for a high degree of Western orientation without a high level of uncertainty. Obviously, BYT achieved a considerable increase in votes by this moves with a position which reveals also a lower degree of uncertainty as provided by the NU in 2006. This gives first hints that the Western orientation may be less dependent on uncertainty compared to the Russian orientation and that, as exemplified by the NU in the 2006 elections, combining Western orientation with a high degree of uncertainty revealed in the party programme may not work that well.

Looking at the party level, some parties changed their strategies between 2006 and 2007 to embrace the ‘willingness to be attached’ concept. Thus, the BYT became more pro-Western, unlike the NU-NS, which lost some points for its ‘willingness to be attached’ but expressed more uncertainty about national self-sufficiency. It is worth mentioning that several parties joined forces with the NU-NS, such as the Pora-PRP and the NBKP. Unexpectedly, this

political actor supported by President Victor Yushchenko received only 14% of the votes, which did not exceed the 2006 election results. The People's Block of Lytvyn appeared as one of the most confident about Ukrainian self-sufficiency, and the strategy of its leader, Volodymyr Lytvyn, of being loyal and neutral might explain why this political actor won more votes (the party received more than the required 3%) than the SPU. In addition, the leader of the SPU, Olexandr Moroz, fell in the ratings while serving as Head of Parliament after the 2006 elections. However, his party also lost votes – 6% of electorate flocked to other political parties. The only political force whose percentages did not change was Vitrenko's Block, which appeared to remain both strongly pro-Russian and uncertain about Ukrainian self-sufficiency according to the pre-defined indicators. Regarding the PR, it won nearly the same percentage of votes in the 2007 re-elections, but its strategy towards national self-sufficiency seems to have become one point closer to zero, which suggests the near-absence of an inferiority complex. However, the PR's success at the polls might have been due to the formation of a coalition with the Viche party. Nevertheless, Ukrainian voters did not support Vitrenko's Block, which displayed the highest level of uncertainty and strongest pro-Russian orientation, or Suprun's Block (including the NDP), which increased its vertical dimension and thus became more uncertain about national self-sufficiency.

The research results regarding 'little russianism' as a form of inferiority complex in Ukraine confirmed the lack of a sense of national self-sufficiency among the country's main political forces and also revealed a 'willingness to be attached' among Ukrainian political leaders. In other words, 'little russianism' was found to be more or less present among all of the analysed political parties and blocks, reflected either in their 'willingness to be attached' through pro-Russian or pro-Western vectors or in their expression of uncertainty about national self-sufficiency.

Thus, it could be argued that because two parties with a fairly low level of uncertainty (the PR and BYT) gained the majority of votes both in 2006 and 2007, Ukrainians are more confident about national self-sufficiency. The BYT in particular expressed a very high level of pro-Western 'willingness to be attached', which could be interpreted as an attempt to offer voters a European approach to alleviating political and economic instability in Ukraine. The EURO-2012 football championship in Ukraine and Poland could serve as a prime example of this approach.

#### *Revealed Preferences – Weighting indicators with election votes*

So far, we only looked at party programmes and showed that the changes made before the re-elections seem to be affected by the analysis of the previous election results. This implies that the indicators on 'little russianism', Western orientation and uncertainty – analyzed above were actually relevant for the election outcome. If this is true than weighting the indicators with the election results reveals the preferences of the Ukraine population. For doing this, we concentrate on the main parties for which we can observe meaningful results for both elections: PR, BYT, NU, SPU, CPU, PBL.

Table 3 shows the results with respect to Western or Russian orientation in the top left of the table. In addition, we have calculated the total amount of indicator point as a measure of total foreign orientation and the difference between Russian and Western orientation as a measure of net Russian orientation. Both measures provide meaningful interpretations

because a neutral position with respect to a net Russian orientation could still imply that there is some (balanced) foreign orientation. Below this indicator results we show the election votes for the main parties in 2006 and 2007 for all regions including the regional aggregates for Ukraine, West, Central, South, and East. On the right, the indicator results are weighted by the election votes for the main parties revealing the preferences for regions and aggregates.

For Ukraine it is evident that the Western orientation was stronger than the Russian orientation in both elections. This difference became even larger in the second election. At the same time, total foreign orientation has declined as well. Hence, Russian orientation suffered from both a total decline as well as some reorientation towards the west. This result is driven by the fact that BYT changed its position towards a Western orientation and received the strongest increase in votes.

The results for the aggregate regions shows the regional divide between West/Center and South/East quite clearly. Initially, the Western orientation was weak and comparable to South and East in the Centre but showed a strong increase in the 2007 elections. South and East were quite homogenous with respect to reducing Western orientation in 2007, an effect which was dominated by a decline of net Russian orientation in all aggregate regions, which was even stronger in South and East. The net effect was most pronounced in the Center – based on strongly increasing Western orientation – and lowest in South and East due to a decreasing extent of either orientation. Total foreign orientation increased in West and Center and declined strongly in South and East, which led to a reversal of the 2006 result when foreign orientation was very strong in South and East. All in all, the two regional groupings West/Center and South/East sharpened their alternative images during the re-election process and the corresponding votes for the parties offering the orientation of choice. The Center matched the West in its increasing foreign and Western orientation.

The results for the single regions or oblasts provide some interesting cases as shown by the maxima (green) and minima (red). The strongest changes are shown by the Kiev and Donetsk Oblasts which exemplify the changes in the Center and the East. Western and foreign orientation increased in the Center and foreign orientation decreased dramatically in the East with Donetsk providing the maximum in 2006 and the minimum in 2007. Even more interesting seems to be the fact that notwithstanding marked regional differences, the decline of net orientation towards Russia was to be found in all regions. There is only one region which showed no decline between 2006 and 2007.

Table 3 – Weighted Orientation

	PR		BYT		NU		SPU		KPU		PBL	
Orientation	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007
Western	1	0	0,5	3	3	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Russian	2	1	0	0	0	0	0,5	0	3	2	1	0
Total	3	1	0,5	3	3	1	1,5	0	3	2	2	0
Net Russian	1	1	-0,5	-3	-3	-1	-0,5	0	3	2	0	0

Ukraine	PR		BYT		NU		SPU		KPU		PBL		Western			Russian			Total			Net Russian		
	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	Diff	2006	2007	Diff	2006	2007	Diff	2006	2007	Diff
	32,1	34,4	22,3	30,7	14,0	14,2	5,7	2,9	3,7	5,4	2,4	4,0	1,2	1,2	0,0	1,0	0,5	-0,5	2,2	1,7	-0,5	-0,2	-0,7	-0,5
<b>West</b>	7,1	9,1	32,0	48,1	30,9	28,6	3,8	2,0	1,3	1,7	2,5	3,5	1,6	1,9	0,3	0,3	0,1	-0,2	1,9	2,0	0,1	-1,3	-1,7	-0,4
Volyn Oblast	4,5	6,7	43,9	57,6	20,7	20,0	4,1	1,9	2,2	2,7	3,3	4,6	1,2	2,1	0,8	0,3	0,1	-0,1	1,5	2,2	0,7	-1,0	-1,9	-1,0
Zakarpattia Oblast	18,7	19,8	20,3	28,9	25,8	31,1	3,6	3,5	1,3	1,8	3,5	6,0	1,5	1,3	-0,3	0,6	0,3	-0,4	2,2	1,5	-0,6	-0,9	-1,0	-0,1
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast	1,9	3,0	30,4	50,7	45,1	36,8	2,3	0,8	0,6	0,8	1,0	1,0	1,9	2,0	0,1	0,1	0,0	0,0	2,0	2,1	0,1	-1,8	-2,0	-0,2
Lviv Oblast	3,0	4,2	33,0	50,4	38,0	36,0	2,2	0,6	0,7	1,0	0,8	1,1	1,8	2,0	0,2	0,1	0,1	-0,1	1,9	2,1	0,2	-1,6	-1,9	-0,3
Rivne Oblast	7,2	10,4	31,3	51,0	25,5	20,8	6,5	2,1	1,9	2,4	4,4	6,1	1,4	1,9	0,4	0,4	0,2	-0,2	1,8	2,0	0,2	-1,1	-1,7	-0,6
Ternopil Oblast	2,0	3,0	34,5	51,6	34,2	35,2	3,7	1,1	0,4	0,7	1,4	1,6	1,7	2,0	0,4	0,1	0,0	-0,1	1,8	2,1	0,3	-1,6	-2,0	-0,4
Chernivtsi Oblast	12,7	16,8	30,3	46,2	27,0	20,3	4,5	3,8	1,7	2,3	3,0	4,2	1,5	1,7	0,2	0,5	0,2	-0,2	1,9	1,9	0,0	-1,0	-1,5	-0,5
<b>Centre</b>	13,6	18,1	34,0	44,4	14,7	16,0	10,8	2,6	4,4	5,3	3,5	5,1	1,1	1,6	0,5	0,6	0,3	-0,3	1,7	1,9	0,2	-0,5	-1,3	-0,8
Vinnitsia Oblast	8,2	12,6	33,3	50,0	20,0	18,6	14,7	2,5	3,4	5,0	2,3	3,1	1,2	1,8	0,6	0,4	0,2	-0,2	1,7	2,1	0,4	-0,8	-1,6	-0,8
Zhytomyr Oblast	18,0	22,4	24,9	37,0	17,5	15,1	8,9	2,5	5,4	5,8	7,1	8,3	1,2	1,4	0,2	0,8	0,4	-0,4	2,0	1,8	-0,2	-0,4	-1,0	-0,6
Kiev Oblast	9,9	13,0	44,5	53,4	11,6	15,1	10,2	2,1	2,3	2,9	2,8	5,1	1,0	1,9	0,9	0,4	0,2	-0,2	1,4	2,1	0,7	-0,6	-1,7	-1,2
Kirovohrad Oblast	20,1	27,0	30,1	37,6	8,7	11,7	9,7	2,8	6,1	6,4	5,1	5,5	1,0	1,4	0,4	0,9	0,4	-0,4	1,8	1,8	0,0	-0,1	-0,9	-0,8
Poltava Oblast	20,4	24,8	26,8	37,9	13,2	14,5	12,7	3,8	5,4	6,5	2,2	4,9	1,1	1,4	0,3	0,8	0,4	-0,4	1,9	1,8	-0,1	-0,3	-1,0	-0,7
Sumy Oblast	10,9	15,7	33,3	44,5	19,4	20,7	10,6	2,0	5,4	5,8	2,3	3,3	1,2	1,7	0,5	0,6	0,3	-0,3	1,8	2,0	0,2	-0,6	-1,4	-0,7
Khmelnyskyi Oblast	10,0	14,1	35,6	48,2	18,3	18,4	9,2	1,7	3,1	4,0	4,4	6,6	1,2	1,8	0,6	0,5	0,2	-0,2	1,7	2,0	0,3	-0,7	-1,5	-0,8
Cherkasy Oblast	10,7	15,5	38,3	47,0	12,2	15,3	13,4	4,3	4,4	4,9	3,0	4,9	1,0	1,7	0,7	0,5	0,3	-0,3	1,6	2,0	0,4	-0,5	-1,4	-1,0
Chernihiv Oblast	15,6	20,7	33,9	41,9	10,3	14,9	12,9	2,9	5,5	6,7	2,6	2,5	1,0	1,6	0,6	0,7	0,4	-0,3	1,7	1,9	0,3	-0,3	-1,2	-0,9

Kiev	11,8	15,0	39,2	46,2	15,8	15,8	5,5	1,6	3,0	4,6	3,4	6,6	1,1	1,7	0,6	0,5	0,3	-0,2	1,6	2,0	0,4	-0,6	-1,5	-0,8
<b>South</b>	<b>51,8</b>	<b>55,1</b>	<b>10,0</b>	<b>13,0</b>	<b>6,4</b>	<b>6,4</b>	<b>3,5</b>	<b>3,2</b>	<b>4,9</b>	<b>8,1</b>	<b>2,5</b>	<b>3,9</b>	<b>1,0</b>	<b>0,5</b>	<b>-0,5</b>	<b>1,5</b>	<b>0,8</b>	<b>-0,8</b>	<b>2,6</b>	<b>1,3</b>	<b>-1,3</b>	<b>0,5</b>	<b>0,3</b>	<b>-0,2</b>
Crimea	58,0	61,0	6,5	6,9	7,6	8,2	1,2	1,9	4,5	7,6	1,4	3,9	1,1	0,3	-0,8	1,7	0,9	-0,8	2,8	1,2	-1,6	0,6	0,5	0,0
Mykolaiv Oblast	50,3	54,4	11,9	16,6	5,6	5,8	4,3	1,9	5,3	7,2	2,5	4,5	1,0	0,6	-0,4	1,5	0,8	-0,8	2,5	1,4	-1,1	0,5	0,1	-0,4
Odessa Oblast	47,5	52,2	9,9	13,7	6,4	6,5	6,3	7,2	3,2	6,2	3,8	5,1	1,1	0,5	-0,5	1,4	0,7	-0,7	2,5	1,2	-1,3	0,4	0,2	-0,2
Kherson Oblast	39,1	43,2	17,4	23,0	9,8	9,0	4,8	2,5	6,8	9,1	3,4	3,7	1,1	0,9	-0,2	1,3	0,7	-0,6	2,3	1,5	-0,8	0,2	-0,2	-0,4
Sevastopol	64,3	64,5	4,5	5,0	2,4	2,3	0,8	2,7	4,8	10,3	1,6	2,5	1,0	0,2	-0,8	1,9	1,0	-0,9	2,8	1,2	-1,6	0,9	0,8	-0,1
<b>East</b>	<b>59,2</b>	<b>59,8</b>	<b>9,0</b>	<b>12,2</b>	<b>4,0</b>	<b>4,5</b>	<b>2,9</b>	<b>3,1</b>	<b>4,6</b>	<b>7,7</b>	<b>1,7</b>	<b>3,7</b>	<b>1,0</b>	<b>0,5</b>	<b>-0,5</b>	<b>1,7</b>	<b>0,8</b>	<b>-0,8</b>	<b>2,7</b>	<b>1,3</b>	<b>-1,4</b>	<b>0,7</b>	<b>0,4</b>	<b>-0,3</b>
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast	45,0	48,2	15,0	20,9	5,3	6,3	3,8	1,4	5,7	7,6	2,9	5,1	1,0	0,8	-0,2	1,4	0,7	-0,7	2,4	1,5	-0,9	0,5	-0,1	-0,5
Donetsk Oblast	73,6	72,1	2,5	3,9	1,4	1,6	3,7	8,0	3,1	6,0	0,4	0,9	1,0	0,1	-0,8	1,9	0,9	-1,0	2,9	1,1	-1,8	0,9	0,8	-0,1
Zaporizhia Oblast	51,2	55,5	10,9	14,7	5,3	4,7	2,9	2,3	5,3	8,3	2,1	5,5	1,0	0,5	-0,5	1,6	0,8	-0,8	2,6	1,3	-1,2	0,6	0,3	-0,3
Luhansk Oblast	74,3	73,5	3,7	5,0	2,0	1,7	1,2	1,2	4,4	8,4	0,7	2,4	1,0	0,2	-0,8	1,9	1,0	-0,9	2,9	1,2	-1,7	0,9	0,8	-0,1
Kharkiv Oblast	51,7	49,6	12,7	16,4	5,9	8,1	2,8	2,6	4,6	8,3	2,3	4,6	1,0	0,6	-0,4	1,5	0,7	-0,8	2,5	1,4	-1,1	0,5	0,1	-0,4
<b>South-East</b>	<b>52,9</b>	<b>55,7</b>	<b>9,9</b>	<b>12,9</b>	<b>6,0</b>	<b>6,1</b>	<b>3,4</b>	<b>3,2</b>	<b>4,9</b>	<b>8,0</b>	<b>2,4</b>	<b>3,9</b>	<b>1,0</b>	<b>0,5</b>	<b>-0,5</b>	<b>1,6</b>	<b>0,8</b>	<b>-0,8</b>	<b>2,6</b>	<b>1,3</b>	<b>-1,3</b>	<b>0,5</b>	<b>0,3</b>	<b>-0,2</b>

Source: The Central Election Commission of Ukraine; <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/>

The weighted results for the other indicator – uncertainty – are shown in Table 4. The procedure for calculation was the same as in Table 3. Two variants have been used: a Broad indicator calculated on the basis of all seven sub-indicators listed above and a Selective indicator which does not include the second sub-indicator, i.e. a general Western or world market orientation which may have the alternative interpretation of economic rationality rather than uncertainty. Clearly, from an economic perspective, variants of capitalism may be implemented depending on country specific circumstances. Nevertheless, an outward orientation is without alternative for economic development.

For the broad indicator, uncertainty was initially more pronounced in South and East but declined strongly so that, as revealed in 2007 elections, uncertainty became more pronounced in West and Center. However, as shown by the difference to the results for the selective indicator, this was only due to the change positions with respect to the second sub-indicator on economic outward orientation which obviously declined in South and East. As argued above, this can also be interpreted as a declining acceptance of a rational strategy – openness. Indeed, the results for the selective indicator show a considerable extent of homogeneity. Here, the decline of uncertainty was even stronger but uniform with respect to aggregate regions. Uncertainty is clearly higher in the South and East as also revealed by the regional / oblast maxima (South/East) and minima (West/Centre).

Table 4 - Weighted Uncertainty

	PR		BYT		NU		SPU		KPU		PBL	
Uncertainty	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007
Broad	4	3	3	3	4	5	3	1	4	3	3	2
Selective	4	3	3	2	4	3	2	0	4	3	3	1

Ukraine	PR		BYT		NU		SPU		KPU		PBL		Broad			Selective		
	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	2006	2007	Diff	2006	2007	Diff
		32,1	34,4	22,3	30,7	14,0	14,2	5,7	2,9	3,7	5,4	2,4	4,0	3,6	3,2	-0,4	3,5	2,5
<b>West</b>	7,1	9,1	32,0	48,1	30,9	28,6	3,8	2,0	1,3	1,7	2,5	3,5	3,5	3,5	0,0	3,5	2,3	-1,1
Volyn Oblast	4,5	6,7	43,9	57,6	20,7	20,0	4,1	1,9	2,2	2,7	3,3	4,6	3,3	3,3	0,0	3,3	2,2	-1,1
Zakarpattia Oblast	18,7	19,8	20,3	28,9	25,8	31,1	3,6	3,5	1,3	1,8	3,5	6,0	3,6	3,5	-0,1	3,6	2,4	-1,1
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast	1,9	3,0	30,4	50,7	45,1	36,8	2,3	0,8	0,6	0,8	1,0	1,0	3,6	3,8	0,2	3,6	2,4	-1,1
Lviv Oblast	3,0	4,2	33,0	50,4	38,0	36,0	2,2	0,6	0,7	1,0	0,8	1,1	3,5	3,7	0,2	3,5	2,4	-1,1
Rivne Oblast	7,2	10,4	31,3	51,0	25,5	20,8	6,5	2,1	1,9	2,4	4,4	6,1	3,5	3,3	-0,1	3,4	2,3	-1,1
Ternopil Oblast	2,0	3,0	34,5	51,6	34,2	35,2	3,7	1,1	0,4	0,7	1,4	1,6	3,5	3,7	0,2	3,4	2,4	-1,1
Chernivtsi Oblast	12,7	16,8	30,3	46,2	27,0	20,3	4,5	3,8	1,7	2,3	3,0	4,2	3,5	3,3	-0,2	3,5	2,3	-1,2
<b>Center</b>	13,6	18,1	34,0	44,4	14,7	16,0	10,8	2,6	4,4	5,3	3,5	5,1	3,4	3,2	-0,2	3,3	2,3	-1,0
Vinnitsia Oblast	8,2	12,6	33,3	50,0	20,0	18,6	14,7	2,5	3,4	5,0	2,3	3,1	3,4	3,3	-0,1	3,2	2,3	-0,9
Zhytomyr Oblast	18,0	22,4	24,9	37,0	17,5	15,1	8,9	2,5	5,4	5,8	7,1	8,3	3,5	3,2	-0,3	3,4	2,3	-1,1
Kiev Oblast	9,9	13,0	44,5	53,4	11,6	15,1	10,2	2,1	2,3	2,9	2,8	5,1	3,3	3,2	-0,1	3,2	2,2	-0,9
Kirovohrad Oblast	20,1	27,0	30,1	37,6	8,7	11,7	9,7	2,8	6,1	6,4	5,1	5,5	3,4	3,1	-0,3	3,3	2,4	-0,9
Poltava Oblast	20,4	24,8	26,8	37,9	13,2	14,5	12,7	3,8	5,4	6,5	2,2	4,9	3,5	3,2	-0,3	3,3	2,4	-1,0
Sumy Oblast	10,9	15,7	33,3	44,5	19,4	20,7	10,6	2,0	5,4	5,8	2,3	3,3	3,4	3,4	-0,1	3,3	2,4	-0,9
Khmelnyskyi Oblast	10,0	14,1	35,6	48,2	18,3	18,4	9,2	1,7	3,1	4,0	4,4	6,6	3,4	3,3	-0,1	3,3	2,3	-1,0
Cherkasy Oblast	10,7	15,5	38,3	47,0	12,2	15,3	13,4	4,3	4,4	4,9	3,0	4,9	3,3	3,2	-0,1	3,2	2,2	-0,9
Chernihiv Oblast	15,6	20,7	33,9	41,9	10,3	14,9	12,9	2,9	5,5	6,7	2,6	2,5	3,4	3,2	-0,1	3,2	2,4	-0,9
Kiev	11,8	15,0	39,2	46,2	15,8	15,8	5,5	1,6	3,0	4,6	3,4	6,6	3,4	3,2	-0,1	3,3	2,3	-1,0
<b>South</b>	51,8	55,1	10,0	13,0	6,4	6,4	3,5	3,2	4,9	8,1	2,5	3,9	3,8	3,0	-0,8	3,8	2,7	-1,1
Crimea	58,0	61,0	6,5	6,9	7,6	8,2	1,2	1,9	4,5	7,6	1,4	3,9	3,9	3,1	-0,8	3,9	2,8	-1,1

Mykolaiv Oblast	50,3	54,4	11,9	16,6	5,6	5,8	4,3	1,9	5,3	7,2	2,5	4,5	3,8	3,0	-0,7	3,7	2,7	-1,1
Odessa Oblast	47,5	52,2	9,9	13,7	6,4	6,5	6,3	7,2	3,2	6,2	3,8	5,1	3,7	2,9	-0,8	3,7	2,5	-1,2
Kherson Oblast	39,1	43,2	17,4	23,0	9,8	9,0	4,8	2,5	6,8	9,1	3,4	3,7	3,7	3,1	-0,6	3,6	2,6	-1,0
Sevastopol	64,3	64,5	4,5	5,0	2,4	2,3	0,8	2,7	4,8	10,3	1,6	2,5	3,9	3,0	-0,9	3,9	2,8	-1,1
<b>East</b>	<b>59,2</b>	<b>59,8</b>	<b>9,0</b>	<b>12,2</b>	<b>4,0</b>	<b>4,5</b>	<b>2,9</b>	<b>3,1</b>	<b>4,6</b>	<b>7,7</b>	<b>1,7</b>	<b>3,7</b>	<b>3,8</b>	<b>3,0</b>	<b>-0,8</b>	<b>3,8</b>	<b>2,7</b>	<b>-1,1</b>
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast	45,0	48,2	15,0	20,9	5,3	6,3	3,8	1,4	5,7	7,6	2,9	5,1	3,7	3,1	-0,7	3,7	2,6	-1,1
Donetsk Oblast	73,6	72,1	2,5	3,9	1,4	1,6	3,7	8,0	3,1	6,0	0,4	0,9	3,9	2,9	-1,1	3,9	2,7	-1,2
Zaporizhia Oblast	51,2	55,5	10,9	14,7	5,3	4,7	2,9	2,3	5,3	8,3	2,1	5,5	3,8	3,0	-0,8	3,8	2,6	-1,1
Luhansk Oblast	74,3	73,5	3,7	5,0	2,0	1,7	1,2	1,2	4,4	8,4	0,7	2,4	3,9	3,0	-0,9	3,9	2,9	-1,1
Kharkiv Oblast	51,7	49,6	12,7	16,4	5,9	8,1	2,8	2,6	4,6	8,3	2,3	4,6	3,8	3,1	-0,7	3,7	2,6	-1,1
<b>South-East</b>	<b>52,9</b>	<b>55,7</b>	<b>9,9</b>	<b>12,9</b>	<b>6,0</b>	<b>6,1</b>	<b>3,4</b>	<b>3,2</b>	<b>4,9</b>	<b>8,0</b>	<b>2,4</b>	<b>3,9</b>	<b>3,8</b>	<b>3,0</b>	<b>-0,8</b>	<b>3,8</b>	<b>2,7</b>	<b>-1,1</b>

Source: The Central Election Commission of Ukraine; <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/>

The overall decline in uncertainty as measured by the indicator is also evident when looking at the sub-indicator in the single party programmes (Table 5). The decline would be even more pronounced if all parties – that is also the smaller once – would have been considered. In addition, there is clearly one sub-indicator, the sub-indicator on economic outward orientation, which increased against the trend. Again, this supports the possibility of an alternative interpretation. Obviously, more parties included this kind of linkage in their programmes while other aspects of uncertainty declined.


Table 5 - Weighted Uncertainty Indicators, 2006/2007

	Vector of Uncertainty							Total	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
<b>2006</b>									
PR			1	1		1	1	4	
BYT	1			1		1		3	
NU	1			1		1	1	4	
SPU	1	1		1				3	
KPU			1	1		1	1	4	
PBL	1		1			1		3	
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>21</b>	
<b>weighted</b>								<b>3,62</b>	
<b>2007</b>									<b>Diff 2006</b>
PR	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	3	-1
BYT	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	3	0
NU	-	2	-	1	-	2	-	5	1
SPU	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-2
KPU	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	3	-1
PBL	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	-1
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>-4,00</b>
<b>weighted</b>								<b>3,23</b>	<b>-0,39</b>

Figure 4 shows that the alternative interpretations for the uncertainty indicators – broad vs. selective – actually have a decisive impact on the overall interpretation. Based on the regional results, the figure plots the correlation between orientation and uncertainty based on both measures. It is worth to mention that there is a clear correlation between the two indicators. Based on the selective indicator, Western and foreign orientation increase with declining uncertainty while net Russian orientation increases with increasing uncertainty. According to this result, only the Russian orientation would be based on uncertainty. The broad indicator leads to the opposite result, i.e. Western or total foreign orientation increases based above all on economic rational while Russian orientation decreases exactly because of the same reason. Hence, as revealed in the 2007 election, the population relates economic openness and world market orientation – interpreted as either uncertainty or economic rational – to a Western or general openness, while a Russian orientation seems to be based on the other aspects of uncertainty included in the indicator. If globalization as a development strategy matters for the Ukraine population, which can be supported by these results, then Western orientation is

to be based on either reducing uncertainties related to this strategy or on economic rationale. EU policies towards Ukraine would have to take that into consideration.

Figure 4 - Correlation between Orientation and Uncertainty, 2007



*European Identity through Neighbourhood Europeanisation*

The EU pursues Neighbourhood Europeanisation in Ukraine through several approaches: bilateral, regional and multilateral (Franke et al. 2010). Each approach includes rationalist tools, based on cost-benefit calculations (demands, rewards and incentives, financial support) and constructivist tools, based on socialisation (linkage-mechanisms). We analyse both types of tools within these three approaches directed to political elite and population and able to influence their identities.

*Political Elite: fading enthusiasm, increasing pragmatism*

The bilateral approach is based on the ENP and its Action Plan (AP), which is an opaque cooperation strategy due to clear and substantial demands to comply with European (EU) civic values, but vague formulated and small incentives and rewards that the EU offers in

exchange for compliance with its demands (Emerson 2008). Indeed, EU strategy towards Ukraine after the Orange Revolution has become more democracy promotion-oriented. The EU offered an ENP AP to Ukraine, which puts more emphasis on democracy promotion than the PCA document before (EU-Ukraine Action Plan, 2005). However, in terms of rewards, the EU provided a rather lukewarm welcome for democratizing Ukraine. The first three-year EU-Ukraine AP (drafted in late 2004 and signed with only few changes after the Orange Revolution in February 2005) did not involve any hint on an EU membership perspective, which is the most promising reward, with ability to unite and consolidate the political elite around the values of European identity.

Despite the discrepancy of demands and rewards, in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution both pro-Orange and anti-Orange political elite still strived for EU membership and repeatedly used the 'EU card' in their programmes (Shumylo 2007). However, this strategy was rather cost-benefit, but not norm oriented. In other words, the political elite followed their preferences, but not their profound conviction and identities. Thereby, the aim of the Ukrainian elite was to make use of a positive attitude of Ukraine's population towards the EU, which was inherited from former Kuchma's regime, and to get merits from expected positive EU reactions i.e., a membership perspective, that the Ukrainian elite expected to follow soon (interview of president Yushchenko for The Times 2005, January 31).

The compliance with the EU's demands on the rule of law provides an additional proof of cost-benefit oriented preferences of political elite. The EU's rewards in democracy promotion, e.g., EU assistance in Ukraine's accession to the WTO and opening of the negotiations on an FTA, have been exclusively linked to 'election plus rights' demands, but not to the rule of law. Furthermore, the EU lacks linkage-mechanisms in the field of the rule of law and thus applies the tool of multilateralism, mainly by approving statements of Council of Europe's Venice Commission, which constantly demands efficient checks-and-balances between state powers (EU Progress Report, 2008). The EU also supports joint cooperation programmes with the Council of Europe for judges' and human rights experts' training (EU Progress Report 2008). Moreover, financial support is not substantial. In the framework of the ENPI for 2007-2010, democracy promotion is addressed by the 1<sup>st</sup> Priority Area, which has a total budget of €148.2 million. This amounts to approximately €37.1 million per year and reveals no substantial increase in financial support in comparison to pre-ENPI period. As the result, political elite often abused the rule of law, in particular the principal of checks-and-balances between state branches.

The currently negotiations about what has been originally called a *New Enhanced Agreement* and now shapes up as *Association Agreement* to replace the PCA make the situation even worse. Because of its 'temporary' character the absence of an EU membership perspective in the AP was not so harmful, as its absence in the new long-term agreement. As the membership perspective remained absent and the public support for EU integration was decreasing, the politicians did not want to appear as 'knocking on closed doors'. As the result the enthusiasm of the political elite on EU and their willingness to articulate European values in the party programs and public discourses is fading (as was shown in the previous section). The political elite began to strategically avoid the issue of European integration in their public rhetoric during parliamentary elections of 2006-2007 (Shumylo 2007) and by far in the presidential campaign of 2009-2010 (Kuzio 2009).

The current leadership of Yanukovich-Azarov re-establishes in the elite structures a pragmatic approach to the EU, based on cost-benefit calculations. His priorities are limited to an FTA with the EU and a free-visa-regime for Ukrainians travelling in the EU (KyivPost 2010). The responsible for European integration in the government of Azarov is Foreign Affairs Minister Kostiantyn Hryshchenko. Although Azarov and Hryshchenko emphasize that European integration remains Ukraine's priority, its realization is not possible for them without constructive and economically beneficial relationship with Russia. It seems that the current executive tries to avoid making a choice between the EU and Russia and might return to the 'bridge'-strategy of balancing between the EU and Russia followed by the former president Leonid Kuchma. Either EU- or Russia-concentrated foreign policy is additionally hindered by the fact that the overstretch government of Azarov does not seem to be a monolith, but a composition of the multiple elite groups, each with its own foreign policy preferences.

The regional approach of EaP is thereby officially highly appreciated for its value added and change from geographical neighbourhood to partnership in EU rhetoric. Partnership is considered to be better than neighbourhood (Yatsenyuk, 2009). However, it is seen as supplementary to a bilateral level of EU-Ukraine cooperation, because the rewards promised in EaP have been already promised for Ukraine in the Association Agreement (Tuz, 2009). Furthermore, in addition to Ukraine that has strong aspirations for EU membership, EaP includes the countries that have never wanted to join the EU and are reluctant partners in their cooperation with the EU. Thus, EaP causes some concern about EU attempt to put Ukraine in the same initiative with these reluctant ENP countries. Hence, the Ukrainian elite focus more on EU-bilateral than on regional cooperation, unless Ukraine would be chosen by the EU to lead this regional group and would receive some additional rewards and support (Yatsenyuk, 2009).

Under circumstances of large demands and small rewards and support, comprehensive linkages are the tools that can promote European identity among Ukraine's political elite. Indeed, a general increase in diplomatic linkages can be observed since ENP was launched in 2004 (diplomatic visits between the EU and Ukraine increased by one third in 2006). The relatively extensive institutional framework of linkage mechanisms (i.e. annual bilateral summits, cooperation councils, ministerial cooperation committees and specialized sub-committees, working groups) was established already in the pre-ENP era. Within ENP there has been some upgrading of working groups to sub-committees and during the current preparations of the *Association Agreement* the institutional linkage mechanisms have been again slightly expanded.<sup>25</sup> However, despite some intensification of diplomatic linkages, the linkages within approaches of Neighbourhood Europeanisation are not dense and too narrowly focused on the executive. Such concentration of linkages might be appropriate in the semi-presidential pre-2004 Ukraine, but not in today's parliamentary-presidential Ukraine.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> For detailed information see <<<http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/847.htm>>> and <<[http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/ukraine/intro/index.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ukraine/intro/index.htm)>>; last accessed on 25 February 2009.

<sup>26</sup> Due to the powerful presidency and weak party systems, the parliament (Verkhovna Rada) played a marginal role in the integration of the country into international structures (e.g. Ishiyama and Kennedy 2001). Under President Kuchma, the parliament was often willing to accept presidential leadership in European matters (Protsyk 2003: 437-9) and abandoned the constitutional right to determine the principles of domestic and foreign policy.

After the Orange revolution, the role of the parliament has changed radically. In the narrow sense, the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan requires adoption of a large package of legislation by the Rada. Therefore, Rada's legislative capacity is likely to influence this process, as it was exemplified during WTO negotiations.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, Rada's formal prerogatives increased, including European issues. In the broad sense, the parliament able to perform its constitutionally-designated functions is necessary for Ukraine to comply with values of European identity: 'stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities'. This goes beyond the law-making function.

However, similar to Accession Europeanization through Enlargement the EU devotes little importance to the Ukrainian parliament.<sup>28</sup> The EU limited its linkage with the parliament to political dialog between the Ukrainian deputies of the Committee on European integration.<sup>29</sup> Despite the wide range of formal competencies and responsibilities, the possibilities of one of the smallest Committee in the parliament, consisting only of 9 deputies, are marginal and declarative. The absence of interest from the side of the European Commission on the institutionalised dialog with the parliament reduces the importance of the Committee in the hierarchy of state bodies. Also the EU has no direct linkages to Ukrainian parties.

#### *Population: left behind 'Schengen' curtains*

Concerning population, the EU stresses the general demands to develop civil society, to ensure respect for human rights and national minorities, to guarantee freedom of media and to improve systems of higher education, so called bottom-up democracy promotion. Although the EU does not offer any substantial reward linked to these demands, it compensates through financial support through TACIS, EDIHR, and Tempus facilities<sup>30</sup> as well as financial support for NGOs or the education system. Furthermore, the new Civil Society Forum in the regional approach of EaP aims at promoting democracy in a bottom-up way.

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<sup>27</sup> The adoption of legislation required for the WTO membership in summer 2005 that was the precondition for further European integration illustrated the difficult inter-branch relations in Ukraine. Due to ineffective cooperation between Tymoshenko's government and the parliament committees, the remaining laws required for the WTO membership were not passed and the WTO entry was delayed until February 2008.

<sup>28</sup> Hence, in the process of the European integration, the EU delegated substantial legislative functions 'upwards' to executives and limited capacities of national parliaments to oversight executives in EU policy formation (Judge 1995).

<sup>29</sup> This Committee was founded in 2002 and since then it carries responsibilities for the EU issues within the Ukrainian parliament. Its competencies include law-drafting, scrutiny of law-drafts prepared by other initiators, and monitoring law implementation.

<sup>30</sup> In 2004-2006, TACIS included the projects on bottom-up democracy promotion – through the close cooperation with the national government – with the budget of €10 million for civil society, media and democracy. EIDHR is more civil society and human rights oriented; its micro projects-programm ensures an additional – without direct involvement of the national government – financial support for civil society. Although Ukraine attracted the largest amount of funds within this Initiative, EDIHR finances are limited: from 1999 to 2006 it allocates only €5.95 million for Ukrainian NGOs. Within ENP, the EU also fosters people-to-people programmes, i.e. exchange between Ukrainian and EU state's societies. This is first and foremost focused on higher education. The budget line *Tempus* promoted since 1993 voluntary *EU-ization* in the field of higher education. The EU also has conducted the extra projects to promote democracy in a bottom-up way. In 2004, the EU launched three election projects combing NGOs, education and media promotion with the funding budget of €1 million (EU Delegation to Ukraine 2004).

However, EU financial support is marginal and thus put threat to sustainability of positive attitudes of the population towards European values.<sup>31</sup> The EU currently only awards 26 Erasmus scholarships to Ukraine, a country of 46 million people, which is not to compare with thousands of Erasmus scholarships for Turkey. There is currently no EU investment in Ukrainian education at all equivalent to the Diplomatic Academy in Yerevan, which opened in February 2010, or the European Humanities University for Belarus, which is currently in exile in Vilnius (Wilson 2010). In addition, people-to-people exchange is hampered by Schengen visa regime, in particular after it was joined by the new Eastern EU member states that previously had free-visa regime with Ukraine. The agreement on visa simplifications for a small group of Ukrainian citizens in exchange for readmission makes little difference (Silina, 2008).

The EU also has done little to overcome the ethnic divergence in Ukraine. Only after the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, the EU has rediscovered the ‘frozen conflict’ in Crimea and has launched a Joint Cooperation Initiative in Crimea, a proposal for a co-ordinated approach to promote social and economic development by the European Commission and a group of interested EU Member States (EU Delegation Press Release 2009).<sup>32</sup> The EU also applies the tool of multilateralism by cooperating in Crimea with the UNDP in Community-Based Approach (CBA) project that will be implemented in close cooperation with to the local Crimean parliament (ARC Verkhovna Rada).<sup>33</sup> Promoting stability in Eastern Neighbourhood is one of EaP priorities, but is still unclear where the new regional approach will bring any additional reward and support to prevent internal conflict in Crimea. Thereby, the issue of Russian minority in the south eastern regions remains largely overseen.

### *Conclusions*

The post-communist identity building has been featured with multiple dichotomies, which we take into account in our conceptual framework. Accordingly, the analysis of post-communist identity building should regard a dual-track nature of this process, in which building of national identity is accompanied with building of supra-national identities. Furthermore, ethnic and civic components of both national and supra-national identities are in nexus and even overlapped. The main domestic forces in the post-communist identity building are elites, in particular the political ones, who transmit their own identities to the population. In its turn, the popular feedback might force the political elites to adapt to the popular attitudes and change their own identities. Besides domestic forces, the external forces – Russia or the EU – have rationalist and constructivist tools at their disposal to forge either

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<sup>31</sup> To promote reforms in education system, a total budget of €53.03 million has been allocated through Tempus projects to Ukraine from 1993 to 2006. By December 2006 134 projects were funded and 100 research scholarships for Ukrainian students and high school lectures were granted. Tempus IV (2007-2013) shifts the focus on financing study programmes with the help of foreign researchers coming to Ukraine. However, Tempus IV financing assistance is limited to €24 million for Eastern Europe (including €10 million for Russia). In addition to TEMPUS, Ukraine profit from two other programmes directed to the education system. By March 2008 Erasmus Mundus Programm has had a budget of €230 million and provided the scholarship for 79 Ukrainians. As a result of the Jean Monnet Programm, by 2008, four European Studies courses were launched at two Ukrainian Universities (Eurobulletin, 2008a).

<sup>32</sup> [http://www.delukr.ec.europa.eu/press\\_releases.html?id=50295](http://www.delukr.ec.europa.eu/press_releases.html?id=50295)

<sup>33</sup> [http://undp.fx-studio.crimea.ua/news\\_detail.php?id=31&locale=en](http://undp.fx-studio.crimea.ua/news_detail.php?id=31&locale=en)

national or supra-national identities (Eurasian/Eastern Slavic or European) in post-communist countries.

We apply this conceptual framework for the case of Ukraine, which is a country with multiple ethnic identities (*Ethnic Ukrainian, Eastern Slavic, Soviet Ukrainian*) and developing civic identity. The country shares the general features of post-communist identity building, e.g., a nexus between national and supra-national identities. Identity building is also under influence of inter-play between the elites and the population, especially since the Orange Revolution and the transformation to a parliamentary-presidential republic. It is moreover the most-likely case of Neighbourhood Europeanization due to its strong willingness of cooperation with the EU, low adaptation costs of European (civic) values and asymmetric dependence on the EU trade and security incentives.

We analyse the programmes of the Ukrainian political parties in the parliamentary elections of 2006 and 2007 with the aim to find out what kind of identities' values and development vectors were articulated. For this, we construct two indicators: 'Orientation' and 'Uncertainty'. The indicator 'Orientation' measures the 'willingness to be attached' and therefore demonstration of the particular vector of 'attaching' (to either pro-Russian or pro-Western entities). Thus, we also distinguish between 'Western Orientation' that we suppose should reveal the promotion of European identity and 'Russian Orientation' that goes in line with the complex of inferiority of 'little Russianism' and Eastern Slavic identity. The indicator 'Uncertainty' measures the lack of self-sufficiency of one's own national identity and is defined on the basis of the grounded theory methodology.

We find out that

- 1) The Western orientation was stronger than the Russian orientation in both elections and this difference became even larger in the second election. At the same time, Russian orientation suffered from both a total decline as well as some reorientation towards the West. This result is driven by the fact that BYT changed its position towards a Western orientation and received the strongest increase in votes. The analysis of orientations at the regional level shows the regional divide between West/Center and South/East quite clearly. Initially, the Western orientation in the Centre showed a strong increase in the 2007 elections while South and East were quite homogenous with respect to reducing Western orientation in 2007. However, a decline of net Russian orientation dominated in all aggregate regions, which was even stronger in South and East.
- 2) The level of uncertainty has overall declined. Thereby, there is clearly one sub-indicator, the sub-indicator on economic outward orientation, which increased against this general trend. Again, this supports the possibility of an alternative interpretation. This can also be interpreted as a declining acceptance of a rational strategy – openness. Obviously, more parties included this kind of linkage in their programmes while other aspects of uncertainty declined. Uncertainty is clearly higher in the South and East as also revealed by the regional / oblast maxima (South/East) and minima (West/Centre).
- 3) The correlation of orientation and uncertainty demonstrates that Western and foreign orientations increase with declining uncertainty while net Russian orientation increases with increasing uncertainty. According to this result, only the Russian orientation would be based on uncertainty. Hence, as revealed in the 2007 election, the population relates

economic openness and world market orientation – interpreted as either uncertainty or economic rational – to a Western or general openness, while a Russian orientation seems to be based on the other aspects of uncertainty included in the indicator. If the integration with Europe as a development strategy matters for the Ukraine population, then EU policies towards Ukraine could influence both popular and elites' identities.

However, our analysis shows that the bilateral, regional and multilateral approaches within EU's Neighbourhood Europeanisation involve no substantial EU rewards, support and linkages directed either forge European values and identity among the Ukrainian political elites or the population. Therefore, Ukraine's political leadership was sometimes more involved in power distribution struggles than in promoting European values in the recent years. The issue of EU cooperation has become an arena where domestic crisis are fought out and where the Ukrainian position is expressed by many often contradictory voices. Furthermore, European values were of marginal importance, as they did not bring merits in terms of substantial EU rewards or electoral voices. However, the current political elite are still ready to cooperate in some dimensions where the asymmetry of EU and Ukraine's preferences is small, where adaptation costs of EU demands are low and where EU rewards are clear-defined and well-targeted with respect to Ukraine's preferences. Whether such a cost-benefit based cooperation would bring its merits in terms of European identity is disputable. The EU is in more favourable position concerning promotion of European values in the population than in the political elite, as popular preferences are norm-oriented and go in line with the values of European civic identity. Thus, to promote European identity in Ukraine's population, not much of rewards, but rather increased financial support and dense linkages in form of people-to-people exchanges. A free-visa regime could be appropriate means to meet the individual aspirations for integration with Europe among Ukrainian population.

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