

## **Colour Revolutions: The View From Moscow and Beijing**

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### **Introduction**

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China was left as the most significant representative of a dwindling cohort of states still committed (at least formally) to the preservation of Marxism-Leninism as a ruling ideology. In the early 1990s, Russia and China appeared to have embarked on highly divergent political paths, with consequent socio-economic implications. Yet in the 2000s, the gulf that separated the two states has narrowed, and even begun to converge on some issues. In 2001, the two states signed a Friendship Treaty that elevated their relationship as “strategic partners” and reaffirmed their commitment to a multipolar world.<sup>1</sup> In the domestic sphere, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had become more accepting of the role of private actors as participants in the public sphere while Russia under the Putin presidency increasingly rejected the Yeltsin administration’s embrace of liberal democracy, seeking to reassert the dominance of the state as the arbiter of political decisions. This has resulted in a certain coincidence of views on the part of the Russian and Chinese leaderships both regarding the relationship of the state to society as a domestic concern as well as a shared perspective regarding interactions with the Western powers, most notably the United States.

This article compares and assesses the Russian and the Chinese leaderships’ reaction to and attitude toward the “Colour Revolutions” that swept across the post-Soviet space in 2003-2005: specifically the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. I argue that Russian and Chinese political elites were not only deeply troubled by their occurrence, but also shared a common assessment of their causes and domestic implications. Part one focuses on comparing the Russian and Chinese leaderships’ response to the Colour Revolutions, both in terms of their analysis of its motive forces, and application of countermeasures to prevent its replication. Part two examines the efforts of the Russian and Chinese governments to devise a domestic policy that would maintain their commitment to market transition—and an accompanying autonomous public sphere—without subjecting the state to the penetration of potentially destabilizing influences from abroad. The conclusion summarizes the main points of this investigation. Here I am concerned primarily with the perceptions of Russian and Chinese leaders, rather than their factual validity. This article, moreover, does not provide a detailed accounting of the events of the Colour Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, which has been undertaken elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

### **Colour Revolutions: The Role of the West**

Both Russian and Chinese reports tended to assess the outbreak of the Colour Revolutions in starkly geopolitical terms.<sup>3</sup> While acknowledging the role of domestic factors —poverty, corruption, rising levels of income inequality, etc.—analysts typically

directed preponderant attention to the actions of the Western powers—specifically the United States—in instigating events. As an April 2005 article in *Renmin Ribao* noted: ‘If we do not speak of the internal political situation, the ability of Colour Revolutions to succeed cannot be separated from the behind the scenes manipulation by the United States.’<sup>4</sup> In this view, the Bush administration’s lofty rhetoric on democracy promotion was a sham, a means of disguising its ultimate goal of preserving US global hegemony. Colour Revolutions, that is the process of regime transformation leading to the installation of pro-Western political leaders, were seen as aimed at eradicating Russian influence in the former Soviet republics. On the one hand, this policy of isolation and containment was reminiscent of the Cold War era; at the same time, the United States was viewed as moving beyond containment to seek regime change in the Russian Federation itself. According to Gleb Pavlovsky, a close advisor to the Kremlin: ‘The US has been using various means to expand its sphere of influence since the Soviet Union dismembered. By supporting pro-West opposition factions in CIS countries, Washington also tried to exert political pressure on Russia through Colour Revolutions.’<sup>5</sup>

Whereas Russia felt most threatened by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, China, as a matter of geographical propinquity, was more focused on political upheaval in Central Asia. Russian commentary on the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan was often relatively sanguine in its assessments, viewing the conflict as much a political struggle between competing clans as an indication of US plotting.<sup>6</sup> Both states, however, considered that the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent expansion of the US presence in Central Asia provided a basis for the United States further to consolidate its position in the region through the fomenting of Colour Revolutions. Such concerns were indicated in the 2005 ‘Declaration of the Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),’ which called for the “relevant parties to the anti-terrorist coalition” to set a deadline for the withdrawal of their military presence in SCO member states.<sup>7</sup> Despite the opaque language, *Renmin Ribao* hailed the document as a ‘Colour Revolution’ declaration that indicated that each country had the right to its own development.<sup>8</sup> In the Chinese view, moreover, Colour Revolutions were targeted toward China as well as Russia. In this sense, the Colour Revolutions were the latest salvo in the West’s longstanding campaign to overthrow the socialist system in China.

Nonetheless, both the Russian and the Chinese leaderships acknowledged that the Colour Revolutions employed new tactics, updated for the post-Cold War era. Instead of the traditional focus on military might as a method of conquest and subordination, the Colour Revolution approach was non-violent, relying on the instruments of soft power. This was imperialism in an updated format, cloaked in the rhetoric of ‘democracy promotion.’ The revised tactics included efforts to infiltrate both from outside and within the designated state, making use of such means as foreign aid, special Western government programs to provide support to democratizing regimes, the Western media (especially the internet), the instigation of what the Chinese referred to as ‘street politics’ (*jiedao zhengzhi*), and the mobilization of youth. NGOs were further identified as a chief catalyst for inciting domestic subversion. As one Chinese assessment put it: ‘NGOs are an instrument that the Western states like to use. They are a “Trojan horse” planted by the Western intelligence agencies.’<sup>9</sup> The Russian and Chinese leaderships were highly sensitive to the pivotal role played by elections as a means to regime transformation in the Colour Revolutions. Western agents were viewed as key in mobilizing oppositional

forces to challenge seated officials. Ironically, the policy of infiltration from within was also well known to them as a classic Bolshevik tactic used by the Comintern in directing Communist party movements in non-Communist states. In this respect, both governments considered that a policy of subversion, which acted to undermine the structural underpinnings of the state, posed in many respects a greater threat to the maintenance of state sovereignty and regime legitimacy, than the more straightforward challenges of conventional military intimidation.

### **Colour Revolutions: Fortifying the State**

The development of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in November 2004 led to intense speculation, both in international and domestic circles, as to which state would be next to fall victim to regime change in the post-Soviet space. Speaking at a press conference in December 2004, Putin indicated that it was extremely dangerous to try to resolve political problems through unlawful means, and that the path of ‘permanent revolutions’ promised nothing good for either these states or their people. Putin further criticized the double standard of US and EU policies, noting that although he did not think the United States had the goal of isolating Russia in its interactions with its neighbours, it was possible that US position on Chechnya represented an effort to create elements that would destabilize the Russian Federation.<sup>10</sup> Chinese leaders were similarly alarmed: in May 2005, CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao was reported to have issued a report at an internal Party conference that called for ‘vigilance’ against US efforts to launch a Colour Revolution in China.<sup>11</sup> Chinese researchers were directed to examine the circumstances surrounding the Colour Revolutions; intelligence officials were dispatched to conduct on the ground investigations in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan; and academics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) were told to devote more attention to political events in Russia and the Central Asian states.<sup>12</sup> Simultaneously, both the Russian and the Chinese authorities hastened to readjust their domestic policies so as to buttress the state against efforts at intrusion from abroad. In the short run, this was seen in a series of measures that sought to restrict the inflow of foreign influences and strengthen state controls over society.

#### *Regulating NGOs*

By the 2000s, NGOs existed in both Russia and China as legally recognized entities, the consequence of loosened governmental controls and emergent efforts to redefine the sphere of state-societal interactions. Western style NGOs first appeared in the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev era and were accorded legal status by the Russian Federation in the early 1990s. According to the Foreign Registration Service (FRS), there were 216,000 NGOs registered in 2007, of which 226 were foreign run.<sup>13</sup> Among the foreign NGOs operating in Russia were a number of organizations funded directly by Western governments. In addition, many Russian NGOs were dependent on foreign support to remain operational. FRS statistics indicated in 2007 that over half of the foreign NGOs legally operating in Russia were recipients of US funding, while over 90 percent of funding for human rights NGOs was estimated to come from abroad.<sup>14</sup>

The Colour Revolutions heightened the Kremlin's already manifest anxiety over the potential of NGOs to challenge governmental authority. Putin indicated these concerns in his 2004 State of the Nation Address in which he noted that some NGOs were oriented toward 'receiving financing from influential foreign foundations,' rather than 'standing up for people's real interests.'<sup>15</sup> Subsequently, moreover, the Putin regime intensified its efforts to enact legislation regulating NGOs. After some modifications, the NGO law (technically a component of a broader set of laws dealing with the activities of non-commercial organizations) was signed by Putin in April 2006. Its net effect was to place NGOs under greater scrutiny. NGOs were now required to register with the FRS, state their aims, present annual accounts of their activities, report sources of funding and provide meticulous records of their spending. Although some of the more onerous measures regarding foreign NGOs submitted to the Duma in 2005 were eliminated in the final version, foreign NGOs were required to report to the FRS regarding their source of financing and methods of distribution. The bill banned foreign funding of Russian organizations that engaged in political activities. This measure was augmented in March 2007 when Putin signed a law that prohibited members of the government from taking part in any activity associated with the operation of foreign NGOs or their Russian subsidiaries.

The Russian NGO law elicited a storm of criticism abroad. Western leaders, including President Bush, expressed their concerns about the bill, and the US Congress passed a resolution denouncing it. Many Russian NGOs also found its provisions alarming. The vagueness of the law—NGOs could be denied registration if they were deemed to threaten the nation's 'sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, national unity and originality, cultural heritage and national interests'—gave the FRS considerable leeway in interpreting what behaviours violated these precepts.<sup>16</sup> The registration requirements were both onerous and expensive, so much so that 60 percent of NGOs were reported in September 2007 as ignoring the mandate to submit reports on their activities.<sup>17</sup> Russian NGOs that did not receive foreign funding in fact were the hardest hit by the new legislation as they often consisted of a handful of members who lacked the staffing and the expertise to do battle with an obstreperous bureaucracy. Both supporters and critics of the legislation have tended to view it as an attempt to monitor the behaviour of foreign actors in the political life of Russia. According to Sergei Markov, a member of the Public Chamber: 'NGOs are the greatest political weapon of the Twenty-First Century.'<sup>18</sup> On the other side of the political spectrum, Sergei Lukashevsky, an activist with the civil society NGO Demos, commented on the law: 'I do not believe that the powers that be have a desire to stamp out civil society as such. But there is a terrible phobia tied to the "Colour Revolutions."<sup>19</sup>

While the Chinese authorities shared their Russian counterpart's apprehension over the potential of NGOs to incite political unrest, the role of NGOs in Chinese society was more ambiguous than in Russia, reflecting China's continued status as a Marxist-Leninist state. In the first instance, even the definition of a NGO in China is problematic. The Ministry of Civil Affairs refers to NGOs as 'people's organizations' (*minjian zuzhi*), a category which is further subdivided into social organizations (*shehui tuanti*); private non-commercial enterprises (*minban feiqiye danwei*); and foundations (*jjinhui*).<sup>20</sup>

On occasion, 'private non-profit organizations' (*minban zuzhi* or *minfei*) that provide social services—i.e. hospitals, retirement homes, etc--are also classified as NGOs. A

further troublesome distinction is between GONGOs (banguanfang zhizhi), government organized non-governmental organizations and other structures that are more autonomous. Some sources classify Chinese NGOs into three categories: 'officially organized' (guanban), 'semi-officially organized' (banguanban), and 'people organized' (minban), but these categorizations also simplify the complex reality of interactions between an individual NGO and state structures.<sup>21</sup> The term 'grass-roots NGOs' (caogen zuzhi) is also used to refer to those—relatively few—organizations that operate independently of the state.<sup>22</sup> Secondly, the rules for registering and monitoring NGOs are acknowledged by all concerned, including the Ministry of Civil Affairs, to be cumbersome, inadequate, and detrimental to the effective development and functioning of NGOs. The first law to regulate NGOs—the Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social Organizations--was promulgated in 1989 in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, and amended in 1998. The impediments to registration are sufficiently onerous—all units must secure a sponsoring department—that many groups chose to register as commercial or industrial organizations (a much easier procedure) or, more likely, not to register at all. The law does not apply to foreign NGOs, which maintain, through various complicated manoeuvres, a tenuous, and technically illegal, existence in China.

According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, there were around 354,000 NGOs registered at the end of 2006, although the actual number was considered to be much higher.<sup>23</sup> In addition, there were estimated to be between 3000-6500 foreign NGOs.<sup>24</sup> Chinese NGOs receive support from a range of private and public sources, including international actors such as the World Bank, governmental structures (including the US Department of State) foundations, and multi-national corporations. Information on the extent to which Chinese NGOs are dependant on foreign funding is speculative. A 2003 report by the US Embassy in Beijing, relying on figures from the NGO Research Centre at Tsinghua University, indicated that 80-90 percent of NGO funding derived from international sources.<sup>25</sup> This figure roughly corresponds to a 2006 article in the *South China Morning Post* indicating that Chinese GONGOs received 75 percent of their annual donations from abroad.<sup>26</sup> By contrast, a 2006 assessment from the Council on Foundations concluded that overseas funding amounted to just seven percent of the budget for grass-roots NGOs.<sup>27</sup> The government targets its financial support to a select group of GONGOs, leaving others, even those with official ties, struggling for existence. Inasmuch as China has yet to develop a philanthropic tradition or to reform its tax structure so as to encourage charitable contributions, many civil society groups, notably those involved with the embryonic environmental movement, have been highly dependent on external sources to maintain their programs.<sup>28</sup>

As in Russia, the outbreak of the Colour Revolutions escalated the concerns of the Chinese leadership over NGOs, leading Beijing to enact a series of measures designed to increase surveillance over their operation. In the wake of events in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005, Chinese authorities ordered that all NGOs registered with industrial and commercial administrative bureaus report to bureaus under the Ministry of Civil Affairs for further review. Under government pressure, a number of non-governmental think tanks were denied registration as their sponsors deserted them.<sup>29</sup> Simultaneously, the CCP launched audits of NGOs receiving funds from foreign sources, in an effort to investigate their financial and political links to pro-democracy groups and foreign

intelligence forces. The Politburo's concern over the infiltration of foreign influence on Chinese scholarship led it to schedule a meeting with the executive members of CASS. In a message posted on the Academy's website, Executive Vice President Leng Rong indicated that 'the leading central comrades emphasized that it is necessary to change the state of affairs of having studies funded by foreign organizations; otherwise, the research work will be controlled by others, with very great malpractice.'<sup>30</sup> In fact, academic institutes received large donations from foreign donors. In his investigation of four US based organizations—the Ford Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Asia Foundation, and the Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (DRL), Anthony Spires reported that these structures allocated the majority of their funding (some 280 million dollars from 2002-2005) to government agencies, academic institutions, and GONGOs. Beijing University ranked number one in grant funds from US private foundations, on a list that included among its top 20 recipients, 16 other academic institutions and three state administered GONGOs.<sup>31</sup> In response to this directive, organizations with close linkages to the US government came under particular scrutiny. In August 2005, for example, the Empowerment and Rights Institute in Beijing, a Chinese human rights group funded by the National Endowment for Democracy was searched and its offices shut down.<sup>32</sup>

Such suspicions were still evident two years later, inflamed by Chinese concerns that the United States was a factor behind the outburst of widespread political unrest led by protesting Buddhist monks in Burma in September 2007.<sup>33</sup> A December 2007 article in *Globe* (Huanqiu), a biweekly magazine published by *Xinhua News Agency*, displayed a menacing picture of Karl Rove, former deputy chief of staff to President George Bush on its cover, promoting its feature story: 'An Investigation of America's Think Tanks: The Black Hands Behind the Scenes of Non-Violent Regime Change.' The article discussed four think tanks—the National Endowment for Democracy (labelled as 'the Second CIA'), George Soros' Open Society Institute, Freedom House, and the Albert Einstein Foundation--which collectively were identified as 'soft daggers,' pointing at targets for regime transformation through Colour Revolutions. Gene Sharp, the founder of the Albert Einstein Institute, was portrayed as an expert at subversion who trained dissidents globally to use civil disobedience as a means of regime change, tactics that were deployed in Burma.<sup>34</sup>

The Colour Revolutions apparently served to delay further China's long awaited efforts to introduce revised regulations for NGOs, which were anticipated to rationalize the cumbersome and difficult registration process, as well as provide some legal recognition for the existence of foreign NGOs. By some accounts, draft regulations for a revised NGO law were to have been released by the end of 2002, but governmental concerns over the emergence of the Falun Gong movement in 1999 served as the major source of their delay.<sup>35</sup> The Colour Revolutions heightened fears of external penetration into what was already a contentious debate over the potential of NGOs to challenge the boundaries of state control. Despite periodic announcements that proclaim their imminent appearance, the revised regulations are still, as of this writing, forthcoming.<sup>36</sup> In this regard, the Chinese response has differed from that of the Kremlin. The Putin administration acted quickly to increase the monitoring controls of the state over NGOs. In contrast, the impact of the Colour Revolutions in China was to extend the deadlock

over the introduction of revised regulations, as various factions within the Chinese leadership debated how far to liberalize NGO policy.

### *Curbing the Media*

By the time of the outbreak of the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, Putin had successfully concluded his battle to assert state supremacy over the media. The oligarchs who were most invested in the media—Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovskii—had been forced to turn over their holdings and to seek sanctuary abroad. The state owned the three main television channels, the principle source of information for most Russians. Pockets of independent journalism existed in a few publications (e.g. *Novaya Gazeta*, the English language *Moscow Times*, etc.) which catered to a narrow educated audience, but the preponderance of media sources, including those formally classified as private, operated under state control. Russian journalists and political analysts reporting on the Colour Revolutions by and large adhered to the Kremlin line, attributing the political movements in the post-Soviet states to the manipulations of the United States and its allies. The Kremlin, however, remained sensitive to the potential influence of the West on reporting in Russia. In January 2007, the director of the Educated Media Foundation (formerly Internews), a NGO directed to the training of journalists, was found with undeclared currency while passing through customs in Moscow. Although normally a minor offence settled with a fine, the government apparently used it as a pretext (and as a warning to other NGOs) to shut down the organization, which was primarily funded by the US Agency for International Development.<sup>37</sup> The Kremlin was presumably well aware that Internews had previously provided support for independent media that played a role in the pro-democracy movements in Georgia and Ukraine.<sup>38</sup>

Although the CCP exercises more control over the media than the Kremlin, and undertakes far more extensive attempts to regulate the internet, China's leaders showed more apprehension about the role of the Western media in fostering Colour Revolutions than their Russian counterparts. Respect for the power of the written word has a long legacy in China. An April 2005 article in *Renmin Ribao* argued that Western media such as the Voice of America and internet sources had a 'profound impact' on the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the outbreak of Colour Revolutions and that although its incitement role was not decisive, 'its influence cannot be underestimated.'<sup>39</sup> Subsequently, in August 2005, the Chinese government announced new rules regarding the oversight of the media, aimed at defending 'national cultural security.' Revised regulations followed in September to tighten restrictions on internet services, including online news stories, bulletin board systems, and message systems sending news to individual cell phones.<sup>40</sup> In this vein, propaganda officials forbade Chinese journalists to report on the October 2005 visit of hedge-fund billionaire and Open Society Institute founder George Soros to China, save a report that he had increased his share in the ownership of Hainan Airlines.<sup>41</sup> In November 2005, the government announced that it was suspending its plans to allow foreign newspapers to print in China. Shi Zhongyuan, Head of the General Administration of Press and Publication was disarmingly frank regarding the motivation for this decision: 'When I think of the "Colour Revolutions," I feel afraid....The Colour Revolutions were a reminder not to let saboteurs into the house and that the door must be closed, so we have closed it temporarily.'<sup>42</sup>

### *Resisting Democracy Promotion from the West*

The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union led Western governments to institute ambitious programs to inculcate structures of civil society and democratic values across the region. Although the Clinton presidency vigorously endorsed democracy promotion, the administration of George W. Bush elevated it to the status of a cardinal precept (at least in rhetoric) of US foreign policy. In his January 2005 inaugural address, Bush pledged that it was ‘the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.’<sup>43</sup> A few months later, in May 2005, Bush reiterated this message standing in Freedom Square in Tbilisi, Georgia, hailing Georgia as a ‘beacon of liberty’ for the region and for the world.<sup>44</sup> Democracy promotion in practice relied heavily on the development of NGOs as autonomous groups reflecting the interests of civil society, but democracy as an outcome was conceived more broadly to include freedom of the press, an institutionalized legal system guaranteeing the rule of law and individual rights, and the exercise of a popular mandate through elections. Although the Yelstin presidency had embraced Western support at its onset, the Putin administration exhibited at best a deep-seated suspicion, if not outright hostility, toward the concept of democracy promotion. Such sentiments were shared by the Chinese leadership. Nonetheless, neither state refused to accept funding for democracy promotion from foreign sources, which was in fact relatively modest in scope. For example, US assistance to Russia for fiscal year 2006 included 45.2 million dollars for democracy programs, a figure that was dwarfed by the 860 million dollars devoted to security and law enforcement, dealing with the securing or destruction of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>45</sup> In 2005-2006, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour of the US State Department allocated about 10.5 million dollars to China.<sup>46</sup>

The Putin administration’s overwhelming concern regarding foreign funding was that it would be used as a means of wielding political influence on the Russian political scene. As Putin noted in his April 2007 annual address to the Federal Assembly:

There has been an increasing influx of money from abroad being used to intervene directly in our internal affairs. Looking back at the more distant past, we recall the talk about the civilizing role of colonial powers during the colonial era. Today ‘civilization’ has been replaced by democratization, but the aim is the same—to ensure unilateral gains and one’s own advantage, and to pursue one’s own interests.<sup>47</sup>

Echoing this sentiment, the State Duma unanimously passed a resolution in May 2007 condemning what it called ‘unprecedented attempts’ by the United States to influence the 2007 legislative and 2008 presidential elections.<sup>48</sup>

The Putin administration’s efforts to combat the infiltration of foreign influences set on democracy promotion eventually came to focus on maintaining tight controls over the electoral process, which was seen as a point of particular vulnerability given the association of the Colour Revolutions with contested elections. Kremlin strategists were similarly aware of the extent to which the Colour Revolutions involved ‘street politics’

and the organization of youth protest. In the Kremlin's view, the work of Western NGOs in organizing seminars and providing training to young people, first in Serbia, and then in the post-Soviet states, had been spectacularly successful, as youth activists had played an influential role in mobilizing opposition to the regime. Subsequently, moreover, youth activists, with support from their NGO sponsors, were eager to export their knowledge of organizational techniques and strategy abroad. Members of the Ukrainian groups Pora and Znaya, for example, held training seminars with Russian youths. Such activities prompted a counter-response by the Putin leadership, which reacted by establishing pro-Kremlin youth organizations aimed at garnering the political support of Russian young people. The largest of these groups, *Nashi* (Ours), was reminiscent of the Soviet era Komsomol in its promotion of anti-fascism, patriotism, optimism, social responsibility, and Russian state sovereignty.<sup>49</sup> The Putin administration was forthright in acknowledging that its youth policy was aimed at preventing the replication of a Colour Revolution on Russian soil. In his talk to *Nashi* members in 2005, for example, Kremlin advisor Gleb Pavlovksy warned of the potential for an Orange Revolution in Russia, informing the young people ('commissars' in *Nashi* parlance) that it was their task 'to protect the constitutional order and physically to resist attempts at unconstitutional revolution.'<sup>50</sup>

By the time of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in November 2004, the Putin administration had come to view elections as a pivotal rallying point for oppositional interests, including those of foreign actors. In this view, elections posed a particular threat to regime stability, providing the opportunity for challengers to contest electoral outcomes and mobilize mass support. These concerns heightened the Kremlin's discomfort with the presence of foreigners, who were not seen as neutral observers, monitoring elections. As Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister noted at the height of the Orange Revolution in 2004: 'Election monitoring is not only ceasing to make sense, but is also becoming an instrument of political manipulation and a destabilizing factor.'<sup>51</sup> Such attitudes had hardened several years later: the Putin administration engaged in months of wrangling with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe over the participation of election monitors, which eventually rejected the conditions imposed by the Russian government, and declined to send teams to oversee the 2007 parliamentary or the 2008 presidential elections.

In addition, the Putin administration increasingly moved to limit the possibilities for oppositional forces to make use of elections to challenge the dictates of the Kremlin. Initial moves in this direction, such as the elimination of single-member districts in the Duma and the raising of the threshold for seating parties from five to seven percent of the popular vote according to proportional representation, were justified on the grounds of efficiency but had the effect of excluding the Western oriented liberal democratic parties from the Duma in the 2007 parliamentary elections. Whereas the Putin presidency tolerated the presence of an opposition on the left, notably the Communists and the Liberal Democratic Party, it came to discredit actors on the political right, depicting them as in thrall to the dictates of Western governments. Former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov was widely depicted in the Russian media as in league with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, working at the behest of Washington.<sup>52</sup> In the run-up to the 2007 parliamentary elections, pro-Western political figures such as Kasyanov and former chess champion Gary Kasparov as well as the opposition coalition,

The Other Russia, were routinely harassed. The Putin administration deliberately evoked the Colour Revolutions, demonizing the opposition as tools of external forces—notably the United States—which sought to destabilize the Russian Federation. A November 21, 2007 speech by Putin to a group of supporters in Moscow encapsulated this perspective in the starkest terms: ‘Unfortunately there are still those people in our country who act like jackals at foreign embassies who count on the support of foreign funds and governments but not the support of their own people...They’ve learnt from Western specialists. They’ve trained in neighbouring republics.’<sup>53</sup> Having shackled the reformist opposition—Kasynov’s efforts to run in the presidential election were rejected by the Central Election Commission—Putin went on to present Dmitri Medvedev as the candidate for the 2008 presidential elections, with the proviso that he would remain on the scene as the prime minister. This scenario was certified by the March 2008 election results in which Medvedev won an overwhelming victory.

As in Russia, China’s leaders were acutely aware of the potential for Western actors to push democracy promotion as a means of political change. US policy-makers throughout a series of presidential administrations routinely prodded China to undertake democratic reforms that would in the words of Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in a 2005 address, effect ‘a peaceful political transition to make its government responsible and accountable to its people.’<sup>54</sup> What the United States viewed as “constructive engagement,” China was more likely to see as inappropriate interference in its internal affairs. In a widely disseminated article, Zhao Xiaoying, the Vice President of the Chinese Institute of Socialism, argued that Western hostile forces were aiming, as always, to install a multi-party political system in China that could be used to build up an opposition to stage a ‘Colour Revolution’ and regime transformation.<sup>55</sup> Although the Chinese leadership did not have to concern itself with the issues posed by multi-party elections on the mainland, it faced a different situation in Hong Kong with its multi-candidate elections to the Legislative Council. In 2005 the CCP issued an order to suppress the democracy movement in Hong Kong.<sup>56</sup> An article in 2006 in *Ta Kung Pao*, a Beijing funded Hong Kong daily, attacked Anson Chan, the former Chief Secretary of Hong Kong, claiming that she was working for US and British forces that sought to use Hong Kong as a base from which to stage a Colour Revolution aiming in the ‘ideal scenario’ at the collapse of the Chinese political system.<sup>57</sup> Similarly, the former chairman of the Guangzhou City Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) claimed that political protests in Taishi village were the result of an attempt of foreign forces based in Hong Kong to promote a Colour Revolution in Guangdong.<sup>58</sup> To the Chinese leadership, Hong Kong with its relatively open society and numerous democracy activists represented a weak link in Beijing’s armour that could serve as a bridgehead to the mainland itself.

### **Dealing with the West in the Long Run**

The success of Uzbek president Islam Karimov in brutally suppressing demonstrators in Andijan in May 2005, followed by the victory of Nursultan Nazarbayev in presidential elections in Kazakhstan in December 2005, and the re-election of Alexander Lukashenko as the president of Belarus in March 2006 conveyed a message that repressive regimes were in a better position to withstand the Colour Revolution

contagion than their more open counterparts. Yet the Russian and Chinese leaderships resisted this assessment in its most simplified form. The Colour Revolutions were viewed by both regimes as a warning about the potential costs of liberalization, indicating the need to keep societal forces in check. But at the same time, the move to tighten controls was seen as a short term response that did not address the more fundamental problem faced by both regimes, namely how to resolve or at least manage the tensions inherent in the process of transition toward a market economy, which imposed a concomitant set of political demands, and necessitated integration into the global capitalist system. The dilemma was how to channel societal opposition and block the unwelcome intrusion of foreign actors without retreating to measures that would threaten goals of national development. For the Putin presidency, the solution was found in the precept of 'Sovereign Democracy.' The Chinese in contrast have struggled with an evolving series of ideological formulations that have challenged conventional interpretations of Marxism-Leninism, arousing dissent within the CCP over the parameters of reform.

### *Sovereign Democracy*

The idea of Sovereign Democracy was the brainchild of Vladislav Surkov, the Kremlin ideologist, and a close associate of Putin. In an address to a meeting of United Russia, the Kremlin associated political party, on February 7 2006, Surkov outlined three principal threats to Russian sovereignty: international terrorism, economic non-competitiveness, and the possibility of Colour Revolutions, a process that he identified as the 'soft absorption by contemporary "orange technologies" with the lowering of the national immunity to foreign activities.' In Surkov's view, the instigators of these efforts sought to undermine values, discredit the state, and provoke domestic issues, with Russia a defined target: 'I am not able to say, that this issue is no longer on the agenda, because if they can achieve this in four states, why not do it in a fifth? Our foreign friends will also try in the future to try to repeat this.'<sup>59</sup>

The issue of defining sovereign democracy—or to be more precise, distinguishing it from its Western variant—has received considerable attention among Russian academic and political elites.<sup>60</sup> On a theoretical level, sovereign democracy is generally considered to incorporate the specific cultural traits of Russian society and traditions; it serves to defend the national interest and independence of Russia. More concretely, this means the maintenance of a centralized political system, making use of what the Kremlin refers to as a "vertical of power." The Putin presidency invariably identified the establishment of civil society (*grazhdanskoe obshchestvo*) in Russia as a key regime goal. The Russian view of civil society, however, differs from that of the conventional pluralist model of the West, which stresses the existence of autonomous groups influencing the policy-making process. In the Russian variant, the emphasis on groups as decision-makers is subordinated to their task overseeing the activities of the civil service and state administration. Putin's speeches have often viewed civil society and the media in particular, as performing a watchdog role in fighting corruption among officials.<sup>61</sup>

The establishment in 2005 of the Public Chamber indicated the top-down approach to state society interactions favoured by the Putin presidency.<sup>62</sup> Hailed as a means to develop civil society in Russia, the Chamber consists of 126 members, one third selected by the president, one third nominated by civil society organizations, and one

third chosen by members of the Public Chamber itself. As Putin announced at its inception: ‘the Public Chamber should promote the creation of effective instruments of feedback between society and the state.’<sup>63</sup> The Public Chamber has served as a forum for the public discussion of societal issues, if among a highly selective group of participants. Items on the Public Chamber agenda have included human rights, health care, the rights of invalids, local self-government, military reform, and demographic and environmental problems.<sup>64</sup> A key priority for the Chamber, as Putin noted in his 2007 state of the nation address, has been an exchange of views and dialogue with NGOs. There is a preference for fostering NGOs that operate under the protective wing of government scrutiny. Included in this strategy is a policy of increased government funding for NGOs.<sup>65</sup> In August 2007, the Russian government announced that it would provide 1.25 billion rubles for funding NGOs in 2008, selected by a public tender. Russian commentary clearly indicated that this endeavour was in response to the dependence of Russian NGOs on funding from abroad. According to Valery Fadeyev, a member of the Public Chamber and the Council on Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights: ‘Against the background of powerful funding by the West, including for political purposes, it is necessary for us to set down our own funding.’<sup>66</sup>

The Kremlin’s approach to civil society in the Putin era bears the earmarks of the Soviet heritage. Although pledging a commitment to the development of civil society, the government has been uncomfortable with the concept of groups acting as independent entities with their concomitant potential to challenge state actions, or to act as the carriers of foreign influence. The state’s concern to scrutinize the activities of NGOs, and most importantly, to monitor the content and extent of foreign funding, took precedence over the development of an NGO law that would be user friendly for small indigenous NGOs. Similarly, the Kremlin has been unwilling to provide tax breaks for Russian companies to fund NGOs, out of a fear that resourceful entrepreneurs—as seen in the case of the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky—would make use of them to promote their own political agenda. The Putin regime’s conception of Sovereign Democracy allotted a central role to the state as the orchestrator of civil society; the two were complimentary in that the development of civil society was dependent on a strong state.<sup>67</sup> According to Putin, ‘democracy is not a street bazaar.’<sup>68</sup> This attitude dictated that the government regulate the state relationship with society, so as to demarcate the boundaries of citizen and group initiatives.

### *China: Coming to Terms with Reform*

While the Putin administration’s construction of Sovereign Democracy is of recent derivation, the Chinese leadership has been embarked on a continuous quest since the onset of its reform program in 1978 to derive a political response to the forces unleashed by economic transition. During this entire period, the CCP has struggled with the question of how far to open up Chinese society. The Chinese leadership was badly shaken by the Tiananmen affair of June 1989 which was roughly commensurate with the demise of most of the socialist bloc. Both of these events, to some degree, were viewed by the Chinese leadership as a consequence of deliberate efforts by Western actors. In June 1989, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was compelled to defend the reform process as correct in the face of a conservative opposition. But he also acknowledged that ‘the

Western imperialists are trying to make all socialist countries abandon the socialist road, to bring them in the end under the rule of international monopoly capital and set them on the road to capitalism.<sup>69</sup> Two decades later, the CCP largely adhered to the same view, with Colour Revolutions simply the latest revision of long term efforts by the West at China's 'peaceful evolution.' Although China's social and economic structure had changed dramatically during this period, the CCP itself was still engaged in a contentious debate over the course of reform. Prior to the Seventeenth National Party Congress in October 2007, for example, 170 retired cadres sent a letter to Hu Jintao, arguing that the CCP should renounce former General Secretary Jiang Zemin's 'Three Represents' as a guiding ideology that sanctioned the entrance of capitalists into the CCP, complaining that rightists in the party were seeking to 'carry out a "Colour Revolution" in China and establish a capitalist dictatorship based on a Western style multi-party political system.'<sup>70</sup>

The divisions within the CCP leadership have meant that formal Party documents reflect the outcome of political negotiation between competing factions. Chinese publications, including those emanating from the Central Party School, often make more radical arguments for political reform than is incorporated into official policy. Several key points, however, can be summarized regarding the dominant thrust of CCP policy as espoused by the political leadership of Hu Jintao and State Premier Wen Jiabao. The CCP remains the sole arbiter of decision-making in the People's Republic of China. Although the regime has sought to expand the parameters of participation in recent years, democracy Chinese style occurs under the leadership of the CCP. The White Paper on China's Political Party System, released in November 2007, identifies eight democratic parties which express societal interests and demands, exchanging views and making suggestions, though the CCCPP, a United Front organization originally established, as with the eight identified parties, prior to 1949.<sup>71</sup> The CCP has also experimented with multi-candidate elections at the local level—most notably village elections—as well as holding some elections to government and party positions in which the list of nominees exceeds the number of available positions. The actual substantive impact of these institutional measures has been, at best, modest, as the CCP has attempted to reinvigorate long established structures (which played a largely symbolic role in the first place) or enact the sort of limited choice elections that were instituted in other former socialist regimes.

This is not to say, however, that relations between the state and the society have not changed markedly in China in the past several decades. The changes have not been a consequence of a deliberate policy of political change planned by the CCP as much as the result of the incremental but steadily accelerating movement to a market economy. As has often been noted, the economic reforms created a private space for citizen initiatives that has allowed the development of autonomous structures. At the same time, the reforms led to the withdrawal of the state from many areas of economic, social, and cultural life, leaving a vacuum that it no longer had the desire or capacity to fill. This development has been considered evidence of the growth of civil society in China. Unlike the Russian government, the Chinese leadership has not formally endorsed civil society as a theoretical construct (a term which is open to multiple interpretations in Chinese translation), although it has signed international agreements recognizing its importance.<sup>72</sup> During the 1990s as the parameters of China's reform program expanded, the CCP leadership acknowledged the need to develop social organizations, including NGOs, and

to groom them to take over tasks that were previously performed by government organs.<sup>73</sup> Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated this theme in his work report to the Eleventh National People's Congress in March 2008, noting the intent of the government 'to bring into play the positive role of civic organizations in expanding public participation in government affairs and voicing the concerns of the people to improve the ability of society to govern itself.'<sup>74</sup>

However, the introduction of the market mechanism has given rise to multiple social and economic tensions—rising social differentiation, increased income inequality, unemployment, etc-- that strain the fabric of Chinese society. Protest incidents are widespread in China but they are largely narrowly focused on economic or environmental issues, rather than directed toward the CCP as the ruling elite.<sup>75</sup> At the same time, the impact of the forces of globalization has generated its own set of internal pressures. For three decades, China's core leadership—although not its detractors on the left—has viewed integration into the global economy as an inevitable requirement of development.<sup>76</sup> The current leadership faces the same quandary encountered by its precursors; how to strike a balance between opening up Chinese society to the outside world, enacting liberalizing reforms that provide complementary structures for a capitalist economy, without surrendering control. In this endeavour, CCP behaviour exhibits distinctly contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, Beijing has developed an extensive relationship with IGOs, welcoming their input and expertise. China is, for example, the largest recipient of environmental aid from the World Bank.<sup>77</sup> Foreign NGOs, despite their unofficial status, pursue ambitious programs within China. In this respect, the CCP leadership welcomes foreign actors provided they refrain from adopting a political agenda. A 2006 article in the newspaper of the Central Party School argued, for example, that foreign NGOs provided essential funding, imparted managerial and technological expertise, aided in the construction of social organizations, and contributed to social programs in such areas as poverty alleviation, and health care.<sup>78</sup> This perspective, however, conflicts with the realpolitik view, simultaneously embraced by the Chinese leadership that regards international actors as potential instruments of infiltration threatening the integrity of the regime. In its fundamental outline, the CCP's view of the state-citizen relationship and the prerequisites for the maintenance of state sovereignty conforms to those of the Kremlin in the Putin administration. The Chinese leadership accepts the privatization of certain sectors of society beyond the economic realm as a practical necessity. CCP rhetoric portrays citizen participation as a means of improving local level governance, restricting abuses of government power—and as in the Russian view—serving as a curb on corrupt officials. As with their Russian counterparts, China's leaders are concerned to maintain a centralized control over the public sphere, regulating channels of domestic and foreign input so that it does not transgress the boundaries—which are by nature ambiguous—set by the regime.

## **Conclusion**

The Colour Revolutions posed both a foreign policy and a domestic threat to the Russian and Chinese leaderships. Russian influence was diminished in the post-Soviet space with the emergence of pro-US regimes. The Chinese were particularly concerned with the installation of a Western oriented government in Kyrgyzstan, which they viewed

as a potential staging area for agents to promote unrest among Uighurs in neighbouring Xinjiang province. Both governments viewed the US goal of promoting democracy as a subterfuge for its strategic aim to expand hegemonic control, establishing subservient governments that would be amenable to its dictates. The global nature of this enterprise indicated that both Russia and China were identified targets of regime change, although with the instruments of soft power adapted to the post-Cold War era. Russia retained the democratic structures instituted in the Yeltsin era, although in a modified format, including multiparty elections. The debate within the CCP about instituting democratic reforms fell far short of raising the possibility of tolerating even a loyal opposition as existed in Russia. Russia was a more open society than China, although the Putin administration displayed, at least verbally, a more hostile attitude toward a foreign presence. Although Russia ranked somewhat higher than China on indexes of globalization, China had a more extensive and generally constructive history of interactions with multinational corporations and international organizations.<sup>79</sup> Nonetheless, both were authoritarian states.

The Russian and Chinese governments reacted to the Colour Revolutions with the institution of preventive measures. These differed somewhat, however, in focus and application. The Kremlin was more tolerant than the CCP of a foreign media presence, was less concerned to regulate the internet, and adopted a relatively relaxed stance toward English language publications in Russia. Although the CCP took steps to increase surveillance and tighten controls over NGOs, the Kremlin was more proactive in its implementation of the 2006 NGO law. The Colour Revolutions had the opposite effect in China, serving to delay passage of the long anticipated revisions to the 1998 NGO regulations. In contrast to the 'vertical of power' exercised by the Kremlin during Putin's second term in office, the Chinese political scene was a veritable hotbed of opposition, albeit that disagreements were largely contested within the ranks of the CCP. The Colour Revolutions strengthened the hand of the Party conservatives who opposed efforts of the reformers to reduce restrictions on the operation of NGOs, as well as provide formal legitimacy to foreign NGOs.

Both the Russian and Chinese press engaged in rhetorical attacks on democracy promotion, considered an instrument of regime transformation. Sovereign Democracy indicated the Kremlin's attempt to introduce a variant of democracy distinct from Western practice that reflected the concrete conditions of Russia. The CCP was equally adamant that Western formulations did not correspond to Chinese needs. The first White Paper on Democracy in China, released in 2005, pointedly noted in its introductory sentences that [the] 'democracy of a country is generated internally, not imposed by external forces,' further asserting that China 'must not copy any model of other countries.'<sup>80</sup> Nonetheless, neither Russia nor China categorically rejected NGO activities earmarked for democracy promotion from abroad. Both governments sought to supervise and regulate foreign funded projects, but they tolerated the presence of structures that were simultaneously regularly assailed as agents of imperialism. This is in contrast to the behaviour of more conservative post-socialist regimes such as Belarus and Uzbekistan which have placed considerably greater restrictions on participation by external actors.

Neither Russia nor China appeared especially susceptible to the Colour Revolution contagion. But both leaderships were preoccupied, if not obsessed, with the maintenance of political stability. The events of the past two decades bore witness to the

fragility of political systems, even those previously considered immutable. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of most of the socialist bloc was an object lesson for both regimes. In addition, the Chinese contemplated the political upheaval of the Tiananmen events which shook the CCP to its core. The Russians looked back on the Yeltsin period as a case of shattered dreams which exposed the expectation that they would rapidly enter into the ranks of Western states as a political and economic equal as an illusion. Under these circumstances, it was difficult to conceive of a predictable future; constant vigilance was a necessity. As Zhen Xiaoying acknowledged in her 2005 article on Colour Revolutions, although the Chinese political system was strong, it was not as secure as people commonly thought.<sup>81</sup> Russian citizens, for their part, apparently felt that the state was at risk: 42 percent of the respondents in a poll conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in July 2005 indicated that events similar to the Colour Revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan could occur in Russia.<sup>82</sup> The Colour Revolutions posed a particular challenge to the Kremlin, revealing the susceptibility of the electoral process to outside manipulation. On the face of it, the heavy-handed tactics of the Kremlin against a marginalized and unpopular opposition in the 2007 parliamentary and 2008 presidential elections seem irrational. But this behaviour is explicable in the context of the administration's fear that the West could join forces with liberal voices to capitalize on latent citizen dissatisfactions against the regime.<sup>83</sup>

The Colour Revolutions highlighted the inherent tensions in the policy choices of the Russian and Chinese governments. The two states are on a road of transition but they do not want the end point to be the liberal ideal described in Francis Fukuyama's end of history.<sup>84</sup> State sovereignty and non-interference in China's internal affairs has long been a mantra of the CCP. The Kremlin's introduction of Sovereign Democracy in the second Putin administration reaffirmed these principles as a key component of Russia's interaction with external actors. The Colour Revolutions were perceived as a threat to state sovereignty which involved the presence of outside forces setting an agenda for political change. Inasmuch as democracy promotion was intended by its sponsors as a transformative mission, it was inevitably a challenge to the Russian and Chinese leaderships. Democracy promotion as an inherently altruistic endeavour, a reflection of Wilsonian idealism, simultaneously coexisted with a more realist impulse that was immediately recognized by the Kremlin and the CCP. The installation of democratic regimes was considered to serve the geostrategic interests of the United States and its allies.

Western scholarship has largely conceived of the development of civil society as a precursor to liberal democracy, a view that has also been adopted by Western governments. As Bruce Dickson has noted, the rise of civil society was seen as pivotal in the collapse of socialist regimes in 1989.<sup>85</sup> This perspective, which underscores the logic of democracy promotion efforts, assumes the emergence of group interests that will be antagonistic to and challenge the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. In contrast, the Russian and Chinese governments have staked their acceptance of a private space for citizen participation on the premise that group input will not be critical of the state but can become a co-opted valuable ally. This view bears some of the footprint of the socialist past, both in the Maoist explication of the 'mass line' and the Leninist notion of mass organizations as transmission belts for the articulation of Party and group interests.

But it differs in that the space between the political organs of supervision and private structures is at present much greater. Civil society, albeit in an adapted paternalistic format, is considered an objective demand of the capitalism system. The conundrum facing the Russian and Chinese governments is that strict restraints on the development of civil society threaten further economic development, a fundamental pillar of regime legitimacy. But opening up the political system poses its own risks, including the possibility that it could unleash societal forces that exceed the boundaries of state control, providing an opportunity for outside actors to promote regime change.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> 'Treaty of Good-Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation,' *Xinhua*, July 16, 2001.
- <sup>2</sup> There is a substantial literature on the Colour Revolutions. See, for example, Paul D'Anieri, 'What Has Changed in Ukrainian Politics? Assessing the Implications of the Orange Revolution,' *Problems of Post-Communism*, September/October 2005, 82-91; Eric A. Miller, 'Smelling the Roses: Eduard Shevardnadze's End and Georgia's Future,' *Problems of Post-Communism*, March/April 2004, 12-21; Matthew Fuhrmann, 'A Tale of Two Social Capitals: Revolutionary Collective Action in Kyrgyzstan,' *Problems of Post-Communism*, November/December 2006, 6-29; and Graeme P. Herd, 'Colourful Revolutions and the CIS: "Manufactured" Versus "Managed" Democracy,' *Problems of Post-Communism*, March/April 2005, 3-18.
- <sup>3</sup> Despite the controls exercised by the state, Russian and Chinese media express a range of political views, depending on the topic and the particular publication. This article relies to a large extent on direct quotes by governmental officials which are assumed to indicate leadership policy preferences. I further assume that analyses in the mainstream mass media generally reflect the position of the Kremlin or the Hu Jintao leadership, a practice that necessitates, however, judgment as to the extent a given source corresponds to official policy.
- <sup>4</sup> Tang Yong, 'Meishi minzhu haishi Meishi badao?' [Is it American democracy or American highhandedness?] *Renmin Ribao* April 26, 2005.
- <sup>5</sup> *Renmin Ribao* WWW-Text, May 16, 2006 in World News Connection 20060516.
- <sup>6</sup> See, for example, comments by Andrei Kokoshin, Chairman of the Duma Committee for CIS Affairs in *Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey* WWW-Text, March 22, 2005 in World News Connection 20050322; Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov in *Itar-Tass*, March 26, 2005; and 'Russian Analysts: Whatever Turn Events in Krgyzstan, Russia Stands to Gain,' *Itar Tass*, November 7, 2006.
- <sup>7</sup> *Xinhua*, July 7, 2005. This request, however, was not repeated in the 2006 or 2007 declarations.
- <sup>8</sup> 'SCO Sends Strong Signals for West to Leave Central Asia,' *Renmin Ribao*, July 8, 2005 in World News Connection, 20050708
- <sup>9</sup> Pan Rulong and Dai Zhengqin, "'yanse gemin" yu guoji fei zhengfu zuzhi' [colour revolutions and NGOs], *Dianzi keji taxue xuebao shekeban*, 7, 4 (2005), 78.
- <sup>10</sup> 'Press-konferentsiia prezidenta RF V.V. Pytina' [press conference of the president of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin] at <http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?tid-25541&cid-1&date-23.23.2004>.
- <sup>11</sup> Frank Ching, 'No Colour Revolution for Us, Please—We're Chinese,' *Singapore Business Times*, October 26, 2005.
- <sup>12</sup> Hamish McDonald, 'China Keeps a Nervous Eye on Colour Revolutions: Clampdown on Foreigners,' *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 15, 2005; 'Hu Jintao Tells CASS to Step Up "Colour Revolution" Studies,' *The Standard*, June 4, 2005.
- <sup>13</sup> BBC Worldwide Monitoring, September 12, 2007; Nicholas von Twickel, 'NGOs Buried by Mountain of Paper,' *Moscow Times*, August 24, 2007
- <sup>14</sup> Vladimir Pavlov, 'Poraboshchenie demokratiey' [enslaved by democracy], *RBK Daily*, July 12, 2007; Nabi Abdullaev, 'US Cash is Lifeblood of Dozens of NGOs,' *Moscow Times*, May 18, 2007.
- <sup>15</sup> <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/05/26>.
- <sup>16</sup> [http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/news/2006/01\\_19\\_Russia\\_NGO\\_Law\\_Analysis.pdf](http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/news/2006/01_19_Russia_NGO_Law_Analysis.pdf)
- <sup>17</sup> BBC Worldwide Monitoring, September 12, 2007.
- <sup>18</sup> Igor Romanov, 'Non-Governmental Organizations Get a Suspended Sentence,' *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, No. 78, April 16, 2007, 1,3 in <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
- <sup>19</sup> Ursula Hyzy, 'Civil Society Struggles in Putin's Russia,' *Agence France Presse*, November 23, 2007.
- <sup>20</sup> See Anthony Spires, *China's Un-Official Civil Society: The Development of Grassroots NGOs in an Authoritarian State* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, December 2007), 5-6. Many Chinese sources also use the term *feizhengfu zuzhi*, the literal translation into Chinese of "non-governmental organization."
- <sup>21</sup> Of course, GONGOs are a commonplace fixture on the global scene, not restricted to China. In this sense, the US government supported National Endowment for Democracy is also a GONGO. See Moises Naim, 'What is a Gongo? How Government Sponsored Groups Masquerade as Civil Society,' *Foreign Policy*, 160 (May 2007), 96-98.
- <sup>22</sup> Spires, *China's Un-Official Civil Society*, 12-13.

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- <sup>23</sup> *Asian News International*, May 25, 2007, at <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> For further discussion, see Qiusha Ma, *Non-Governmental Organizations in Contemporary China: Paving the Way to Civil Society?* (New York: Routledge, 2006), and Anthony Spires, *China's Un-Official Civil Society*. Spires contends that the number of NGOs operative in China is routinely overestimated by both foreign and Chinese sources. See Spires 15-16.
- <sup>24</sup> *Global News Wire*, May 30, 2005 at <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; 'International NGOs in China,' October 23, 2005 at <http://www.china.org.cn>.
- <sup>25</sup> 'Chinese NGOs—Carving a Niche Within Constraint,' at <http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn>.
- <sup>26</sup> Laurence Brahm, 'Nation Without Charity,' *South China Morning Post*, June 20, 2006, 13.
- <sup>27</sup> <http://www.ise.bassu=china.org.cn>; Spires' research collaborates this point, noting that foreign organizations are oriented toward funding GONGOs and ignore grass roots NGOs as potential candidates. See *China's Un-Official Civil Society*, chapter four.
- <sup>28</sup> For further discussion, see Elizabeth Economy, *The River Runs Black* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), especially chapter five, 129-175.
- <sup>29</sup> See Qiu Xin, 'China Curbs Civil Society Groups,' *Asia Times*, April 19, 2005; Hong Kong Report: 'Private Think Tanks Bogged Down in Difficulties,' *Sing Tao Jih Pao* (Internet Version-WWW), September 6, 2005; WNC 20050906; 'Registering as Enterprises and Increasing Interaction with the Government—Nongovernmental Think Thanks Change Tactics to Survive Amid Pressures,' *Sing Tao Jih Pao* (Internet Version-WWW), February 1, 2006 in WNC 20060201.
- <sup>30</sup> 'Hu Jintao Urges Vigilance Against "Colour Revolutions",' *The Standard*, June 4, 2005.
- <sup>31</sup> The three GONGOs were the China Youth Development Foundation, the China Automotive Technology and Research Centre, and the China Law Society. Spires, *China's Un-Official Civil Society*, 141-142.
- <sup>32</sup> Jehangir S. Pocha, 'Foreign Funded Nonprofits Under Investigation in China,' *Boston Globe*, June 15, 2006; 'Beijing Human Rights Group Raided,' *UPI*, August 30, 2005.
- <sup>33</sup> Willy Wo-lap Lam, 'Chinese Communist Party Keeps High Vigilance over "Colour Revolution" in Burma,' *Apple Daily*, September 28, 2007.
- <sup>34</sup> 'Meiguo wei zhiku diaocha—fei baoli zhengquan gengdiede muhou heishou' [investigation of American think tanks—the black hands behind the scene of non-violent regime change], *Huanqiu*, December 12, 2007, 39-43. An English translation is available at <http://chinascope.org/main/content/view/677/92>.
- <sup>35</sup> <http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/ngos.htm>
- <sup>36</sup> See for example, 'NGOs Getting More Prominence,' *China Daily*, April 22, 2005; and 'NGOs Have More Room to Develop,' *China Daily*, May 25, 2007.
- <sup>37</sup> Other donors included the European Union, the Canadian government and the Ford Foundation. Peter Finn, 'Russian Probe Shuts Media Foundation,' *Washington Post*, June 29, 2007.
- <sup>38</sup> 'Top US NGO in Russia Suspends Work After Raid,' *Agence France Presse*, April 20, 2007.
- <sup>39</sup> Lei Da, 'American Media Boost the "Colour Revolutions",' *Renmin Ribao*, April 4, 2005, in WNC 20050504.
- <sup>40</sup> Edward Lanfranco, 'China's Futile Web Clampdown,' *UPI*, September 25, 2005.
- <sup>41</sup> Murie Dickie and Richard McGregor, *Financial Times*, November 18, 2005.
- <sup>42</sup> Dickie and McGregor, *Financial Times*, November 18, 2005; *Straits Times*, November 21, 2005.
- <sup>43</sup> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/index.html>
- <sup>44</sup> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/print/20050510-2html>
- <sup>45</sup> <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/66166.html>
- <sup>46</sup> <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/57669.htm>
- <sup>47</sup> [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/04/26/1209\\_type70029](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/04/26/1209_type70029)
- <sup>48</sup> Bryon MacWilliams, 'Russian Lawmakers Attack American Charities,' *Chronicle of Philanthropy*, May 7, 2007.
- <sup>49</sup> The *Nashi* manifesto is set forth at <http://www.nashi.su>
- <sup>50</sup> Michael Schwartz, 'Russia's Political Youths,' *Demokratizatsiya*, (Winter 2007), 81.
- <sup>51</sup> C.J. Chivers, 'Russia Aims to Cut Vote Observers,' *International Herald Tribune*, October 25, 2007.
- <sup>52</sup> See 'Madeleine Albright's People are Indeed Working with Kasyanov,' *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, July 20, 2006, in WNC 20060720; Carl Schreck, 'Kasyanov, US NGO Deny Teaming Up for "08" Vote,' *Moscow Times*, July 25, 2006.
- <sup>53</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk>, November 21, 2007. A video of Putin's speech can be found at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I0xsHXa65jQ> For a discussion of Putin's choice of vocabulary (i.e. the

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use of the criminal slang *shakalyat* [to scavenge like jackals]), see Michael Bohm, 'The Jackals Scavenging Among Us,' *Moscow Times*, December 14, 2007, 8.

<sup>54</sup> 'Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility,' Remarks to the National Committee on US-China Relations, September 21, 2005 at <http://www.ncusr.org>

<sup>55</sup> Liu Yueh-shan, 'Scholar: CPC Cautiously Guards Against "Color Revolution",' *Wen Wei Po*, May 29, 2005 in WNC 20050528.

<sup>56</sup> Willy Wo-Lap Lam, 'Zhang Dejiang Has Got Deng Xiaoping Theory Muddled Up,' *Ming Pao*, November 8, 2005 in WNC 20051108.

<sup>57</sup> BBC Worldwide Monitoring, August 4, 2006.

<sup>58</sup> 'Chen Kaizhi Points Out Some People Establish Contacts with Taiwan, Britain, and the United States: Hong Kong's Reactionary Forces Trying to Create Chaos in China,' *Ming Pao*, March 5, 2006 in WNC 20060305.

<sup>59</sup> Suverenitet—eto politicheskii sinonim konkurentosposobnosti [sovereignty—this is the political synonym of competitiveness] at <http://www.edinros.ru/print.html?id=111148>.

<sup>60</sup> A number of these attempts can be accessed on the internet site of United Russia at <http://www.edinros.ru>.

<sup>61</sup> See, for example, Putin's interview with *Time Magazine*, December 19, 2007, and the transcript of his Yearly Large Press Conference, February 14, 2008 at <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches>.

<sup>62</sup> The Federal Law on the establishment of the Public Chamber is available at <http://www.rg.ru/printable/2005/04/07/obshestv-palata-dok.html>

<sup>63</sup> *Itar Tass Weekly News*, East View, 2005-08-03.

<sup>64</sup> *Itar Tass*, November 26, 2007. Further information about the Public Chamber is available at its web site at <http://www.oprf.ru>

<sup>65</sup> In 2006, the Public Chamber selected the recipients for state funding for NGOs; in 2007 procedures were changed somewhat to involve selected NGO representatives participating in the selection process.

<sup>66</sup> 'Nekommercheskie organizatsii nachinayut osvoenie byudzheta' [Noncommercial organizations begin to master the budget], *Kommersant*, July 8, 2007.

<sup>67</sup> See, for example, Dmitri Medvedev's remarks in the *Moscow Times*, January 25, 2008.

<sup>68</sup> Annual Large Press Conference, February 14, 2008 at <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches>.

<sup>69</sup> Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Vol. III (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), 302.

<sup>70</sup> 'An Open Letter to the 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress,' *Boxun News Network WWW-text*, October 18, 2007 in World News Connection 20071018. The "Three Represents" referred to the development of the advanced productive forces, of Chinese culture, and of the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people.

<sup>71</sup> 'White Paper on China's Political Party System,' at <http://www.10thnpc.org.cn>

<sup>72</sup> For a discussion of the Chinese conception of civil society and its variant translations, see Qiusa Ma, *Non-Governmental Organizations in Contemporary China: Paving the Way to Civil Society?* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 18-22. For an example of Chinese endorsement of civil society as a construct, see 'Full Text of Joint Statement of 10<sup>th</sup> China-EU Summit,' BBC Worldwide Monitoring, December 3, 2007.

<sup>73</sup> Tong Saich, 'Negotiating the State: The Development of Social Organizations in China,' *China Quarterly*, No. 161 (March 2000), 128.

<sup>74</sup> 'Full Text: Report on the Work of the Government,' March 19, 2008 at <http://www.english.people.com.cn>

<sup>75</sup> In 2005, Chinese official statistics reported 87,000 'mass incidents' compared to 58,000 in 2003. *Agence France Presse*, January 8, 2007.

<sup>76</sup> China's left-wing critiques include conservative cadres within the CCP, and the so-called 'new left' intellectuals, who are typically operate outside of the boundaries of the Party, but are critical of what they perceive as the neo-liberal policies of the current Chinese leaders. For an expanded discussion, see Joseph Fewsmith, *China Since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chapter four.

<sup>77</sup> Economy, *The River Runs Black*, 189.

<sup>78</sup> Zhao Liqing 'Ruhe kandai zai zhongguode waiguo feizhengfu zuzhi' [how to regard foreign NGOs in China], *Xuixi shibao*, August 23, 2006, at <http://www.chinaelections.org>. Zhao also noted the potential

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negative impact of NGOs, the threat they posed to state security and societal stability, while concluding that for the present, their positive contributions outweighed the negative.

<sup>79</sup> Russia ranked 33<sup>rd</sup> with a globalization index of 69.82 compared with China's ranking of 43 with a globalization index of 64.56 on the 2008 KOF Index of Globalization. KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Press Release, January 8, 2008.

<sup>80</sup> The full text of this document, *The Building of Political Democracy in China*, is available at [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/19/content\\_486206.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-10/19/content_486206.htm)

<sup>81</sup> *Wen Wei Po*, May 29, 2005 in WNC 20050528.

<sup>82</sup> 'Rossiyane zhдут "tsevtnyuyu revolyutsiyu"' [Russians expect a color revolution], at [http://www.gazeta.ru/print/2005/07/15oa\\_164086.shtml](http://www.gazeta.ru/print/2005/07/15oa_164086.shtml)

<sup>83</sup> Peter Rutland makes this same argument in 'Misha One Percent,' *Moscow Times*, February 1, 2008.

<sup>84</sup> Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History,' *The National Interest* (Summer 1989), 3-18.

<sup>85</sup> Bruce Dickson, *Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 17.